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CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
ABOUT CANADA'S NEW POLITICAL
FINANCE REGIME ©
COLIN FEASBY*
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered
the constitutionality of some aspects of the political
finance regime that has been in place since 1974.
Recent political finance reforms raise new and
challenging constitutional questions. This article
examines whether the political finance reforms
introduced in the 2003 Elections Act and 2006
Accountability Act-limits on political contributions
by individuals and an outright prohibition on union
and corporate political contributions-are contrary
to Charter guarantees of freedom of expression and
freedom of association. Parliament's conflict of
interest in regulating the democratic process and the
implications that this conflict has for Charteranalysis
of the recent political finance reforms is highlighted.
La Cour supreme du Canada a pris en
consid6ration [a constitutionnalit6 de certains aspects
du r6gime de. financement politique qui est en place
depuis 1974. Ls r6centes r6formes du financement
politique ont soulev6 de nouvelles questions et enjeux
constitutionnels. Le pr6sent article examine si les
r6formes du financement politique, introduites par Ia
Loi electorale de 2003 et la Loi fMd&ralc sur la
rcsponsabilitd de 2006 restreignent les contributions
politiques des particuliers, et si ces r~formes
constituent une interdiction pure et simple A l'6gard
des contributions politiques des syndicats et des
entreprises, et sont contraires la Charte qui garantit
la libert6 d'expression et d'association. L'article met en
lumire le conflit d'int6r.ts du Parlement quant i la
r~glementation du processus d~mocratique et, au
moyen de la Charte, des r6percussions de cc conflit sur
les r~centes r~formes du financement politique.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Political finance regulation came of age in Canada in 1974 with
the adoption of the Election Expenses Act.1 The defining features of the
political finance regime were public funding of electoral participants and
spending limits imposed upon them. A fundamental change to the 1974
political finance regime occurred in 2003. Amendments to the Canada
Elections Act' in 2003 drastically reduced the ability of corporations and
unions to make political contributions and also introduced limits to the
size of contributions by individuals to electoral participants. To mitigate
the impact on electoral participants' ability to raise private funds, the 2003
Elections Act also provided for enhancements to the public funding of
'S.C. 1974, c. 51.
2 S.C. 2000, c. 9, as am. by An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax
Act (political financing), S.C. 2003, c. 19 [Elections Ac.
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political parties.3 The contribution limits introduced in the Elections Act
were superseded by even stricter individual contribution limits and a
complete ban on corporate and union contributions in the 2006
Accountability Act.4 The transformative effect of the 2003 and 2006
reforms on electoral participants and tactics cannot be overstated.
The merits of these significant amendments have been debated in
public and academic contexts, but scant consideration has been given to the
question of the constitutionality of the changed political finance regime.
Indeed, given the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of spending limits
in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General),5 one may wonder why the changes
to the political finance regime introduced in the Elections Act and the
Accountability Act raise constitutional concerns at all. The object of this
article is to dispel this superficial view and show that the Elections Act and
the AccountabilityAct do, in fact, raise serious constitutional questions, and
to offer some tentative thoughts on how such questions might be resolved.
The new contribution limits infringe the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,6 specifically the section 2(b) guarantee of
freedom of expression and the section 2(d) guarantee of freedom of
association, and are not easily justified under section 1. Contribution
limits directly inhibit the ability of individuals to express the intensity of
their political sentiment and may indirectly hamper the ability of the
recipients of contributions-electoral participants-to disseminate their
political views. The prohibition on corporate and union contributions
not only constrains exoression, but targets expression by certain groups
and, as such, contravenes freedom of association. That freedom of
expression and freedom of association are infringed is not surprising.
The Supreme Court in Libman v. Ouebec (Attorney General)' ruled
that spending limits in the context of a provincial referendum infringed
both freedom of expression and freedom of association, and that
3 This article principally focuses on the impact of recent changes to the political finance
regime on political parties and the resulting constitutional issues. There is much to be said about
the impact of these same changes on candidates and constituency associations. Indeed, readers
should be cognizant of the fact that a significant portion of the total political funds (private and
public) are controlled by candidates and constituency associations, not national political parties.
4 FederalAccountabilityAct, S.C. 2006, c. 9 [Accountability Acd.
s[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [Harper].
6 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11., s. 7 [Charter.
7[1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 [Libman].
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spending limits in Harper violated freedom of expression. The real
question is whether the new contribution limits can be justified under
section 1 of the Charter, as spending limits on individuals and interest
groups were in Harper
Section 1 analysis in political finance cases has largely focussed on
the balance between egalitarian or fairness objectives and the importance
of unfettered political expression. The new political finance regime,
though born out of an impulse to stem corruption, addresses the same
egalitarian and fairness objectives as the spending limit system previously
upheld by the Supreme Court in Harper. If the constitutional analysis of
contribution limits were this simple, there would be no reason to expect a
different result. The profound changes to the political finance system,
however, require consideration of the constitutionality of the new political
finance regime to go several steps farther than the Court went in Harper
There are three section 1 issues raised by the new political
finance regime. First, the new political finance regime, particularly the
elements introduced in the Accountability Act, has a distinct partisan
bias that tilts the electoral playing field in favour of the governing
political party. I have previously argued that partisan bias in legislation
governing the electoral domain is constitutionally objectionable.8 Simply
put, the problem with rules governing elections is that members of
Parliament are in a fundamental conflict of interest: they are both the
rule-makers and the subjects of the rules. If, as the data presented in
this article suggests, the strict contribution limits in the Accountability
Act have a partisan bias, that may be a sound reason to find that certain
parts of the legislation are not justifiable under section 1. Second, the
new political finance regime targets expression by certain groups-
corporations and unions-that have played an important and largely
uncontrolled role in political financing since at least as early as the
beginning of the twentieth century. The strong, link between Canada's
large trade unions and the New Democratic Party (NDP) is well known
and was favourably commented upon by the Supreme Court in
dismissing a challenge to a law permitting the conscription of union dues
for political use against the wishes of a union member.9 Third, the main
instrument of the new political finance regime-contribution limits-is a
s Colin Feasby, "Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process" (2005)
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 237 [Feasby, "Freedom of Expression"].
9 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne].
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more direct and effective tool for achieving the egalitarian objectives that
justify the existence of spending limits. It is not a normative or ideological
argument against spending limits; it is merely functional. If equality of
political influence between citizens is the main objective of political
finance legislation, direct limits on political contributions are more
effective than spending limits on electoral participants that are, at best,
indirect constraints on the political influence and expressive capacity of
individuals. This article also considers whether there are alternative
justifications for spending limits that may override the functional
advantages of contribution limits.
Part II of this article is divided into two sections. The first section
briefly traces the origins of Canada's political finance regime from 1874
through to the adoption of the modern political finance regime featuring
expenditure limits a century later in 1974. It also discusses Canada's
abortive experience with a corporate and union contribution prohibition
in the progressive era. The second section discusses pre-2004 patterns of
political contributions for the major political parties. Generally, the
Liberal Party was disproportionately dependent on corporate and large
individual contributions, the NDP was dependent on large union
contributions, and, in relative terms, the Bloc Qu6b6cois (Bloc) and the
Conservative Party (including its most significant progenitors) enjoyed
more populist fundraising bases. This background is necessary to
understand the impact of the 2003 Elections Act and 2006 Accountability
Act changes, to assess the question of partisan bias, and to understand the
union-NDP and corporate-Liberal linkages.
Part III reviews the political context that provided the impetus
for reform (specifically the Sponsorship Scandal and the Gomery
Commission), and the Liberal government's pre-emptive attempt to
diffuse the public desire for reform, the Elections Act. It analyzes pre-
2003 political contribution data and post-2003 political funding data and
suggests that the Elections Act reforms have partisan impacts. It
discusses the context for further reform, including anecdotal accounts of
legal avoidance behaviours, and outlines the relevant provisions of the
2006 Accountability Act. It concludes with an analysis of contribution
data from 2004-2006 which show that the Accountability Act reforms
can be expected to only have a significant negative impact on the Liberal
Party. In other words, the Accountability Act tilts the electoral playing
field against the government's main rival for power.
Part IV outlines my suggested approach to constitutional
analysis of democratic process problems. It identifies and briefly
2007]
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discusses democratic norms evident from prior cases and suggests that
the interaction between these norms and the priority given to each norm
in any given instance is a matter on which the courts should defer to
Parliament. In practical terms, this means that Parliament should, in
most cases, be found to have asserted a pressing and substantial
objective in the first part of the section 1 analysis. This Part argues that
at the second stage of the section 1 analysis, a critical posture should be
adopted and courts should be vigilant in policing partisan and self-
interested legislation touching on the democratic process. While there
should be deference in the first part of section 1 analysis to Parliament's
stated values and objectives, because of the risk of manipulating the
political playing field, little deference should be given to the means
employed by Parliament to achieve those values and objectives.
Part V considers the US campaign finance legislation and
jurisprudence, which has long favoured contribution limits over expenditure
limits. Two cases, in particular, are considered: the seminal 1976 decision
in Buckley v. Valeo,1 where the US Supreme Court determined that
contribution limits were less problematic than spending limits from a First
Amendment perspective; and the US Court's 2006 reconsideration of
contribution and expenditure limits in Randall v. Son-elI" In addition,
this Part considers US cases concerning corporate and union contribution
limits. These decisions consider some of the issues that may come before
Canadian courts if the new contribution limits are challenged.
The final Part of this article analyzes three constitutional questions:
(1) Are individual contribution limits unconstitutional?; (2) Are bans on
union and corporate contributions unconstitutional?; and (3) Are political
party spending limits now unconstitutional? The discussion arising from the
first question concerns partisan bias and its importance to constitutional
analysis in the electoral context. The second question also touches on the
issue of partisan bias, but focuses more on the normative issues associated
with limiting freedom of association and freedom of expression of
corporations and unions. The last question involves consideration of
whether the US preference for contribution limits over spending limits on
functional grounds has merit in the Canadian context.
'0424 U.S. 1 (1976) [Buckley].
1174 U.S.L.W. 4435 (US 27 June 2006) [Randall].
[VOL. 45, No. 3
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II. THE OLD POLITICAL FINANCE REGIME
A. The Political Finance Regime before the 2003 Elections Act
The history of Canadian political finance regulation is a familiar
story. 12 However, a brief review of some salient developments helps to
put the reforms of 2003 and 2006 in context and provides a background
for understanding the practical impact of the new regime on political
parties. As will be explained in detail below, the 2003 and 2006 reforms
introduced political contribution limits for individuals and prohibited
political contributions by corporations and unions. The prohibition on
corporate and union contributions marked a return to an unsuccessful
progressive era restriction, whereas contribution limits on individuals
have no precedent in Canada at the federal level.
13
The regulation of Canadian political finance effectively began
seven years after Confederation, when Alexander MacKenzie's Liberal
Party enacted the Dominion Elections Act 4 in 1874. The act was
modelled after the British Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, " and it applied
to candidates, not to political parties. The focus was also entirely on
expenditures, not contributions. The principal innovations in the Dominion
Elections Act were the requirements that candidates incur expenditures
through an agent and that the agent and candidate together were
responsible for producing a financial report concerning expenditures.
Following some minor scandals in 1906 and 1907, and roughly
coincident with the enactment of the US Tillman Act restricting corporate
political activities, the Dominion Elections Act was amended 16 to prohibit
contributions to candidates by corporations other than those incorporated
12 For good accounts of the history of Canada's political finance regulation see W.T.
Stanbury, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 1991) [Stanbury, Money in Politics]; K.D. Ewing, Money, Politics, and Law: A
Study of Electoral Campaign Finance Reform in Canada (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
' Contribution limits of varying levels are found in many of the provinces. See e~g.
Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-2; The Election Finances
Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. E32; Political Process Financing Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. P-9.3; Elections Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. E-2; Nunavut Elections Act, S.Nu. 2002, c. 17; Election Finances Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. E.7; and Election Act, R.S.Q., c. E-3.
4 S.C. 1874, c. 9.
's See Stanbury, Money in Politics, supra note 12 at 28. For a discussion of the history of
the comparable British legislative regime, see K.D. Ewing, The Funding of Political Parties in
Britain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) [Ewing, Funding of Political Parties].
6 An Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, S.C. 1908, c. 26.
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solely for political purposes. Further amendments were made to the
Dominion Elections Act in 1920, requiring disclosure of contributions and
expanding the prohibition on contributions to include all corporations as
well as unincorporated associations, including trade unions. 7 However, the
prohibition on corporate and union contributions to candidates proved
unenforceable. 8 The Barbeau Committee studying political finance
regulation in 1966 noted a variety of ways in which the law was
circumvented, such as through employee bonuses that were then given to a
political party. The Barbeau Committee concluded that "[tlhe law was ...
only a legal platitude, this time made even more empty by virtue of its
pretension."'9 The weaknesses of the early twentieth century corporate and
union contribution ban noted by the Barbeau Committee in 1966 are
echoed in some of the commentaries on the 2003 and 2006 restrictions on
corporations and unions and in some of the post-2003 experiences.20 The
prohibition on corporate and union contributions was repealed in 1930.21
The recommendations of the Barbeau Committee in 1966 and the
Chappell Committee in 1970-1971 resulted in a half-hearted attempt to
introduce political finance reform before the 1972 election.22 The Barbeau
Committee and Chappell Committee recommendations eventually resulted
in comprehensive reforms in the 1974 Election Expenses Act.23 The main
features were: (1) regulation of political parties; (2) candidate and political
party expenditure restrictions; (3) disclosure of contributions to political
parties and contributor identities; (4) public funding in the form of partial tax
deductions for political contributions and partial reimbursement of candidate
expenditures; and (5) a prohibition on expenditures by third parties. The
feature that was notably absent from the 1974 Election Expenses Act was
contribution limits. Each of the basic elements of the 1974 regime remains in
place today, though specific spending limits and levels of funding have been
changed over time as a result of court challenges and legislative amendments.
17 An Act respecting the Election of Members of the House of Commons and the Electoral
Franchise, S.C. 1920, c. 46.
18 Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1996)
[Barbeau Committee]; Ewing, Funding of Political Parties, supra note 15 at 9.
9 Ewing, Funding of Political Parties, ibid. at 20.
2 See Part III below.
21 An Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, S.C. 1930, c. 16; Stanbury, Money in
Politics, supra note 12 at 29.
22 Stanbury, Moneyin Politics, ibid. at 34.
3Supra note 1.
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Reimbursement of political party election expenses was introduced in 1979 in
the form of a reimbursement for broadcasting expenses and was modified to
apply to election expenses generally in 1983.24 In 1989-1991, the Lortie
Commission undertook a review of many aspects of the electoral system.25
This included an extensive review of political finance issues, despite which no
significant changes were introduced in the next major amendment to the
ElectionsActin 1993.26 Neither the 1993 amendments nor other amendments
before 2003 fundamentally altered the 1974 political finance regime.27
B. Pre-2004 Political Contribution Patterns
There was a stable political party system from before the adoption
of the 1974 political finance regime through to 1993.28 During this period
there were three major parties: the Liberal Party, the NDP, and the
Progressive Conservative (PC) Party. The data in Appendix II shows that
the Liberals and the PCs, the two dominant parties, raised comparable
amounts of money and were dependent in significant measure on
corporate contributions. Neither of the parties raised any meaningful
funds from trade unions. By contrast, the NDP relied significantly on
labour union contributions, largely to the exclusion of corporate
contributions. The NDP typically raised less than the Liberals and PCs.
Everything changed in the 1993 election with the emergence of the
Bloc and the Reform Party. Each of these parties was populist in its own way.
The Reform Party was the latest in a line of insurgent populist movements in
Western Canada motivated by both a conservative ideology and a dislike
2 4Stanbury, Money in Politics, supra note 12 at 66-67.
2 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing: Final Report, 3 vols.
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991) [Lortie Commission].
26 An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19.
27 The most notable feature of the 1993 and 2000 amendments was the attempt to restore parts
of the 1974 apparatus by responding to court decisions striking down third party expenditure limits by re-
enacting those limits in slightly changed forms. National Citizens' Coalition Inc. v. Canada (A.G.) (1984),
11 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (Alta. Q.B.) [National Citizens' Coalition] struck down third party spending limits
under the Charter. The 1993 amendments to the Canada Elections Act reintroduced these limits, which
were struck down again in Somerville v. Canada (AG.) (1996), 136 D.LR. (4"') 205 (Alta. CA)
[Somerville]. Third party limits were again introduced in the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, and
were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in Harper, supra note 5.
28 For a discussion of Canadian political party systems and the emergence of a new system
at the 1993 election, see R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross & Lisa Young, "A New Canadian Party
System" in William Cross, ed., Political Parties, Representation, and Electoral Democracy in
Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002) 15.
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for government dominated by central Canada. The Bloc is a party of Quebec
nationalists who seek to remove Quebec from Canada. The emergence of
these two parties was accompanied by the near-collapse of the PC Party as a
parliamentary presence. The PC Party obtained a share of the popular vote
comparable to the Bloc, NDP, and Reform Party, but because of the
distribution of votes the PCs were reduced to two seats in a 295-seat
Parliament. The Liberal Party was left as the only party with strong national
representation and organization. The fracturing of the opposition parties in
the election of 1993 paved the way for a decade of comfortable Liberal rule,
unchallenged by an opponent able to mount a convincing national campaign.
Appendix II shows that the contribution patterns for the three
major parties that had predominated prior to the 1993 election changed in
subtle ways. The Liberal high point for number of contributors was in 1993,
and in most years after that the Liberals raised more money from a dwindling
number of contributors. The Liberal Party remained dependent on corporate
donations and contributions that were, on average, significantly larger than
those received by its main competitors. The inescapable conclusion is that
following the 1993 election, the Liberal Party attracted a disproportionate
amount of funds from corporations and wealthy individuals because it was
the only plausible governing party. The PC Party's electoral debacle in 1993
led to a decline in the number of donors and amounts raised. Meanwhile,
the NDP became increasingly dependent on union contributions. The NDP's
dependence on corporate and (principally) union contributions in the five
years before the 2003 Elections Act came into force ranged between 21.2%
and 52.6% of its total funds raised. Perhaps equally telling, Appendix I
shows that in each of the same five years, the NDP had between six and
eight of the largest ten donations made to any one political party.29
The Bloc and the Reform Party (called the Canadian Alliance from
2000 onward) differed from the three established political parties in that
neither had long-standing corporate donor relationships or union
affiliations. Both parties were fundamentally populist in their approach to
politics and fundraising. The Bloc initially did not accept donations from
corporations or unions. Even in the period immediately prior to the 2003
ElectionsActraised only a modest proportion of its funds from corporations
29 Elections Canada does not aggregate contributions by affiliated entities such as national
unions and union locals or corporations and their subsidiaries. For example, in the case of the
Liberal Party, if the contributions of the major banks are aggregated with separate contributions
made by their investment banking divisions, the total amount for some banks in some years would
be equal to or greater than some of the top ten contributions.
[VOL. 45, No. 3
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and unions. The Reform Party did not have any principled objection to
receiving such funds, but received comparatively few donations because of its
novelty and the limited appeal of its policies to large corporations and unions.
From 1996 onward, the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance consistently
received more contributions by number, though not value, than any other
party including the governing Liberals. As the Reform Party/Canadian
Alliance came to be seen as a plausible alternative to the governing
Liberals, its success in attracting corporate donations improved, though
it never came close to equalling the success enjoyed by the Liberal Party.
III. A NEW POLITICAL FINANCE REGIME
A. The Sponsorship Scandal and the Context for Reform
The 1995 Quebec referendum was a near-death experience for
Canada. Quebec voters rejected a vague sovereignist resolution by only a
small fraction of a percentage point. The federal government of the day,
formed by the Liberal Party under the leadership of Jean Chr6tien, resolved
not to repeat the experience. The Chr6tien government adopted a two-
pronged, post-referendum strategy to blunt the separatist movement. First,
the government sought to define the legal terms for future referenda on
sovereignty or secession. The key elements of this effort were the Secession
Reference 30 to the Supreme Court of Canada and the subsequent adoption
of the ClarityAct3 This prong of the strategy showed strength and firmness.
Second, the government attempted to woo disaffected Quebec voters with a
co-ordinated effort to raise its profile in Quebec. One of the main aspects
of this prong of the government's strategy was the so-called "Sponsorship
Program," which gave money, at the direction of the Prime Minister's
Office, to cultural and sporting events in Quebec. From 1996 to the end of
the Sponsorship Program in 2002, Canada's name and logo were ubiquitous
at events from the Montreal Grand Prix to the smallest country fair.
In 2002, a report by the Auditor General revealed irregularities in
the way some Sponsorship Program funds were spent and accounted for.32
This report was followed by a more comprehensive report in early 2004, in
30 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [Secession Reference].
J' S.C. 2000, c. 26.
32 Report to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services on Three Contracts
Awarded to Groupaction (8 May 2002), online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/
albl5d892a 1f761a852565c40068a492/852ef3f9ee85d6b985256c5a00629d7f>.
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which the Auditor General documented problems with contracts given to
some Montreal-based advertising agencies.33 The agencies were ostensibly
hired to place advertisements at events and to distribute funds to events
in Quebec. However, in some instances it appeared that the government
received little or nothing in exchange for its payments to the advertising
agencies. The Auditor General found that during the four year period
commencing in 1997, "the Sponsorship Program consumed $250 million
of taxpayers' money, and more than $100 million of that amount went to
communications agencies in fees and commissions."34 This was not a usual
case of government waste; some of the implicated advertising agencies
had worked on Liberal Party campaign advertising and were also donors
to the Liberal Party. This hint of corruption resulted in a public outcry
for a more comprehensive public investigation and reform.
B. The 2003 Elections Act: Contribution Limits and Increased
Transparency
The Chr~tien government declined to appoint a commission of
inquiry. Instead it sought to deflate public antipathy through pre-emptive
reforms to the political finance regime. While at that time there was no
known trail to connect Sponsorship Program funds back to the Liberal
Party, diversion of government funds to political parties seemed to be an
obvious risk. Even if political finance reform did not address the real
problems of the Sponsorship Program revealed by the Auditor General, it
did tackle the broader public concern about corruption. Prime Minister
Chr6tien, introducing Bill C-24 for second reading, announced it as "a bill
that will change the way politics is done in this country, a bill that will
address the perception that money talks, that big companies and big
unions have too much influence on politics, a bill that will reduce cynicism
about politics and politicians.... " Prime Minister Chr6tien's remarks are
noteworthy for emphasizing the promotion of accountability and
remedying the perceptions of improper influence and not for promoting
3 November 2003 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (10 February 2004), online:
<http:/www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html03menue.html>. Note that the delivery of the report
was delayed until February 2004 because the House of Commons was prorogued in November 2003.
' Office of the Auditor General of Canada, News Release, "Mismanagement of
Sponsorship Program extended to five major Crown corporations and agencies" (10 February
2004), online: OAG < http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/media.nsf/html/20031103pre.html>.
'House of Commons Debates No. 057 (11 February 2003) at 1535 (Right Hon. Jean Chr~tien).
[VOL. 45, NO. 3
Canada's Political Finance Regime
the more customary egalitarian justification for political finance controls.
The Elections Act introduced a number of fundamental changes to
the political finance regime,36 including the first contribution limits at the
federal level: contributions by individuals to each political party, its
candidates, and its constituency associations were limited to $5,000 in the
aggregate.37 Corporate and union contributions to national political party
organizations were prohibited, but corporations and unions were still
permitted to contribute up to $1,000 to each candidates and constituency
associations." The contribution limits were complemented by enhanced
disclosure of donations to local political party organs, and by transfers to
national political parties and increased public funding for political parties."
The limits on the size of donations by individuals and the limits
on both the size and destinations of corporate and union donations
created the risk that such money would flow through alternative
channels.4" The remedy to this problem was to make contribution limits
apply to political parties and affiliated candidates and organizations in
the aggregate and to impose increased transparency on political parties,
including candidates and local organizations. Even with these safeguards,
political scientist William Cross and Liberal Party President Stephen
LeDrew expressed concerns about circumvention in their testimony
before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.41
The limits on contributions by individuals and the prohibition on
corporate and union contributions created the potential for a funding
shortfall. This, in turn, justified the introduction of enhanced public
funding.42 The post-election reimbursement for political parties increased
36 For a detailed description of the political finance regime after the adoption of the
Elections Act 2003, see Colin Feasby, "Canada" in Thomas D. Grant, ed., Lobbying, Government
Relations and Campaign Finance Worldwide: Navigating the Laws, Regulations and Practices of
National Regimes (New York: Oceana, 2005) 57.
3 7ElectionsAc4 supra note 2, s. 25 amending s. 405(1). The $5,000 limit was indexed to inflation.
' Ibid., s. 24 amending s. 404.1(1). Corporations and unions were permitted to donate up
to $1,000 (indexed to inflation) to constituency associations and candidates of a political party.
'
9
Ibid., ss. 23, 30.
0 This is the so-called "hydraulic effect" that is seen in US campaign finance. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, "The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform" (1999) 77 Texas
L. Rev. 1705 [Issacharoff & Karlan, "Campaign Finance Reform"].
4i Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House AffaiS 37th Parl.
2nd sess. Evidence of william Cross (6 May 2003) at 1120 and of Stephen LeDrew (29 May 2003) at 1610.
4 Liberal House Leader Don Boudria: "The aim of these measures is essentially to compensate
for the shortfall of parties and candidates subject to prohibitions relating to corporations and unions, and
the ceilings on contributions by individuals." See Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate
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from 22.5% of election expenses to 50%. 43 Inter-election funding was also
introduced, entitling each political party to funding based on its share of the
popular vote in the previous general election.' The amount was set in 2004
at $1.75 per year for each vote received in the previous election, and was
to increase in accordance with inflation thereafter. The enhanced public
funding has been criticized by conservatives as welfare for politicians and
by Canadian nationalists as funding for the Bloc's secessionist agenda.45
One of the most notable sources of opposition to the 2003 Elections
Act was the Liberal Party's executive. Liberal Party President Stephen
LeDrew proclaimed the contribution limits to be "dumber than a bag of
hammers., 46 LeDrew's view seemed to be that the then-current regime
worked to the Liberal Party's advantage and that limits on corporate
contributions could only hurt the party. The level of public funding was
increased from $1.50 in the original draft of Bill C-24 to $1.75 in the version
that was passed into law as the Elections Act, partly in response to
LeDrew's criticisms.4' The figures presented in Appendix II indicate that
LeDrew's concerns were well founded. In the decade prior to the
adoption of Bill C-24, annual donations to the Liberal Party by
corporations ranged from 39% to 64% of the total funds raised. By
contrast, the figures in Appendix II show that its principal rival, the
Canadian Alliance, was more effective at raising money through small
donations from individuals. Corporate contributions made up less than
20% of the contributions to the Canadian Alliance in the three years
preceding the adoption of Bill C-24. The disparity of the two parties'
funding bases was noted frequently in the Parliamentary debates in
2003, before the passage of the Elections Act.
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 37th Parl. 2nd sess. No. 13-Evidence (17 June 2003)
["Boudria Testimony"]. See also Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and
HouseAffaiS 37th Parl. 2nd sess. Evidence of Don Boudria (3 April 2003) at 1125.
43 Elections Act, supra note 2, s. 39 amending s. 435.
' Ibid., s. 40 adding s. 435.01(1). Funding between elections was subject to a requirement that
the political party receive 2% of the national popular vote or 5% of the popular vote in districts where it
endorsed a candidate. These thresholds were struck down as contrary to s. 3 of the Charter in Longley v.
Canada (Attorney General) (2006) 277 D.L.R. (4th) 327 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Longle].
4
',"Let political parties raise their own money" The [Montreal] Gazette (25 August 2006) A18.
46 John Gray, "Reality Check" CBCNews Online (13 June 2006), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/
news/background/realitycheck/grayl20060613.html >.
47 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs- Thirty-Sith Repoat
See also the evidence of Benjamin Hutzel, Chief Financial Officer of the Liberal Party of Canada: House
of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (29 May 2003) at 1620.
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Bill C-24, which was to become the 2003 Elections Act, provoked
a range of reactions from political parties during the Parliamentary debates
that preceded its adoption. The Bloc welcomed Bill C-24, asserting that it
was the fulfillment of a long-standing party objective, and proudly noting
that the new law followed the example of Quebec's provincial political
finance legislation which was instituted by the provincial separatist party,
the Parti Qu6b~cios.48 The PC Party and the NDP supported Bill C-24 but
expressed concern about its details. The NDP was most concerned that
affiliated and subsidiary corporations were treated differently than union
locals.49 The PC Party expressed concern about the advantages that the
public funding formula conferred on the governing Liberals." The Canadian
Alliance supported some aspects of Bill C-24 in principle but objected to
the bill as a whole, and especially to enhanced public funding, on the
grounds that political parties should be supported by voluntary donors and
not by funds conscripted from the public treasury. During the debates in
the House of Commons, Canadian Alliance speakers also noted that the
enhanced public funding system would make it more difficult for new
parties to achieve electoral success.5' The Parliamentary debate ended
and Bill C-24 passed the third and final reading on 11 June 2003, with the
Liberals, NDP, and Bloc voting in favour and the Canadian Alliance and PCs
voting against.5" The new limits became effective on 1 January 2004.
C. Partisan Bias of the New Regime?
1. Contribution Limits
The 2003 Elections Act was imposed on a political finance
environment where certain contribution patterns were well established
and perhaps, in some cases, becoming more pronounced. The impact of
contribution limits and the extent to which those impacts were
4House of Commons Debates, No. 114 (9 June 2003) at 1635 (Hon. Jean-Yves Roy).
49 Ibid. at 1320 (Hon. Alexa McDonough).
'oIbid. at 1230 (Hon. Gerald Keddy).
s' Ibid. at 1250 (Hon. Ken Epp). The bias of Bill C-24 against small parties is discussed in
Daniel Mol, "Thanks to Bill C-24, Do We Have a Canadian Political Cartel?" Canadian Student
Review 13:1 (March/April 2004) 1. Some small parties have also suggested that the limit on the size
of donations is also an obstacle. See Jennifer Ditchburn, "Party loan writeoff sparks funding
debate" The Globe andMail(lO July 2006) A8.
2 House of Commons Debates No. 116 (11 June 2003) at 1800.
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ameliorated by the enhanced public funding is germane to the
constitutional questions considered in Part VI of this article.
Before the ElectionsActwent into effect, LeDrew's view that the
new law would hurt the Liberal Party's ability to raise private funds was
reasonable based on pre-2004 contribution patterns, and is in fact
supported by the 2004-2005 data (see Appendix II and Table 2, below). In
2004, the first year under the new regime, the Liberal Party raised less
than 20% of the amount it raised in 2003 and less than it raised in any
year since 1989. The Liberal Party's fundraising efforts improved in 2005,
but the total raised still lagged behind the amounts raised in the years
prior to 2004. As will be discussed in the next section, the Liberals'
funding woes were mitigated by the new public funding.
There is some difficulty in assessing the impact of the new political
finance regime on the Canadian Alliance and PC Party because it coincided
with a merger of those parties. Nevertheless, the Conservative Party that
resulted from the merger was by far the most successful at raising funds
under the new rules. During the first year of the new regime, the
Conservative Party raised more money than the Canadian Alliance did
during the last year under the old rules and over twice as much as any other
political party. In 2005, the second year under the new regime, the
Conservative Party increased its total funds raised by approximately 70%
and raised more money than the other three major political parties
combined. The data for 2006 and early 2007 indicate that the Conservative
Party continues to be markedly more successful than the other parties in
fundraising.53 The Conservative Party's great fundraising success in the
face of the restrictive rules in the Elections Act is attributable to the large
base of individual donors inherited from the Canadian Alliance and the
swift adoption of grassroots fundraising techniques.54
I See Bruce Cheadle, "Conservatives continue to dominate fundraising" Canadian Press (2
November 2006) online: <http:/Avww.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticeNews/story/CTVNews20061102!Conservatives_
fundraising_061102>. Kate Lunau (quoting former Liberal strategist Warren Kinsella) reported:
The Conservatives and New Democrats have "been able to adjust to the new reality," Kinsella said. "It's
a lot of blue-haired old ladies and folks sending in their $100, their $500. Going back to their Reform
roots, [the Conservatives] always had a ... cultural tradition of fundraising. And the NDP, through its
prairie, agrarian roots has also had that tradition. The one party that did not-and as I say, had been way
too dependent on corporate money-was the Liberal party, and now it's paying the price quite literally."
See "Empty pockets: Liberal fundraising falls woefully short in first quarter of 2007" Macleans,
online: <http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20070502_1036571072>.
'4 Bea Vongdouangchanh, "Conservatives out-fundraise governing Liberals, again" Hill
Times (7 November 2005).
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The NDP was not nearly as adversely affected by the limits on
union and corporate contributions as the Liberal Party. Contributions to
the NDP in 2004 and 2005 were significantly less than in 2003; however,
it is clear that the NDP's main union contributors deliberately increased
their contributions in 2003 in anticipation of the pending contribution
limits.55 The total value of NDP contributions in 2004 and 2005 is almost
the same as the value of contributions received in 2001 and 2002. The
NDP's ability to weather the imposition of the ban on union contributions
is not a reflection on the importance of union donations prior to 2004;
rather, it speaks to the party's success in adapting to the new
environment by increasing funds raised from individual contributions.
The NDP's ability to maintain revenues under the new political
finance regime belied other more fundamental changes resulting from
the new contribution limits. Harold Jansen and Lisa Young posit that an
economic or utilitarian understanding of party and union motives
suggests that the new limits on contributions should break the union-
party link.56 In addition to the contribution limits, they note that the new
rules prevent the NDP from obtaining loan guarantees from unions in
advance of election campaigns, as was common practice under the old
political finance regime, and also prevent the seconding of union staff to
the NDP campaign organization. 57 Despite the obstacles to union
financing of the NDP, Jansen and Young conclude that the relationship
was restructured as a result of the Elections Act rather than severed. In
their view, the relationship persisted because of ideological affinities
and the involvement of union personnel in the NDP party organization.
The short-term restructuring of the NDP-union partnership faces
challenges in the longer term.58 The historic NDP coalition of unionized
workers, prairie populists, urban intellectuals, and, more recently,
environmentalists has inherent tensions and may come apart without the
s- H. Jansen & L.. Young, "Solidarity Forever? The NDP, Organized Labour and the
Changing Face of Party Finance in Canada" (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian
Political Science Association, 2005) [unpublished] [Jansen & Young, "Solidarity Forever"].
56 Ibid. at 3.
5 7 Ibid. at 16, 19.
" The negative impact of Bill C-24 on the union-NDP relationship is one reason why
Professor Ewing has recommended that the United Kingdom not follow Canada's lead and adopt
contribution limits. He also notes that in Britain the Conservative Party enjoys a significant
advantage in number of individual donors, just like in Canada. See K.D. Ewing, The Cost of
Democracy- Party Funding in Modern British Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2006) at 48, 221-22.
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glue of union money. An early sign of the possible breakdown of the NDP-
union alliance is the demise of the NDP's relationship with the Canadian
Autoworkers (CAW). During the 2005-2006 election campaign the
President of the CAW, Buzz Hargrove, publicly endorsed strategic voting for
Liberal candidates and made campaign appearances with Liberal Prime
Minister Paul Martin. The Ontario wing of the NDP reacted by stripping
Hargrove of his membership in the party. At the CAW's annual meeting in
the summer of 2006, the CAW officially ended its relationship with the
NDP.59 Despite this example, it is too early to know whether other unions
will follow. Indeed, some other unions have criticized the CAW's move.60
Nevertheless, if the CAW can secure advantages by being a political free
agent, other unions may follow the CAW's example. Whether or not others
follow, the CAW's defection from the NDP divides Canadian unions and
weakens the NDP's traditional claim to being the only political party that
can speak for unionized workers.
2. Public Funding
According to Don Boudria, the Minister responsible for
shepherding the 2003 Elections Act through Parliament, the increased
public funding of political parties was designed to compensate the parties
for the loss of funds that would otherwise be raised from the private sector.61
This "compensation" was to be based on performance in the last election.
However, prior to the Elections Act, private funding did not always mirror
the popular vote of the previous election. Certain parties consistently out-
performed their electoral standing in fundraising and others consistently
underachieved in relation to their electoral performance.
Figure 1 shows each party's share of fundraising in relation to its
share of the popular vote in the previous election. It shows that three
political parties-Liberal, PC, and Reform/Alliance-have raised funds at
a rate slightly less than or roughly equal to their share of popular vote.
Two other parties diverge significantly from this pattern. The NDP's
fundraising has traditionally been far more successful than its
performance in federal general elections. By contrast, the Bloc has been
s "CAW, NDP splitsville after long marriage: A new reality for New Democrats" The
Toronto Star(19 August 2006) F02.
'" See e.g. Wayne Fraser, Director, United Steel Workers 6, "CAW decision to drop NDP
support full of ironies" online: <http://www.usw.ca/program/content/3327.php>.
6" "Boudria Testimony," supra note 42.
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less successful at raising funds than it has been at securing votes. Figure 1
suggests that if contributions were banned and the state was the only
source of funding, the only clear winner would be the Bloc and the only
obvious loser would be the NDP.





Libera .. Prgrsve Consvatiye N.D.P - - Bloc Qubbcois - Rcforn Allance
Minister Boudria's idea of public funding replacing lost private
funding would only have worked (save for the effects on the NDP and Bloc
noted above) if the public funding fully supplanted the market for private
funds. The contribution limits in the Elections Act preserved the market
for contributions of $5,000 or less per year from individuals. Accordingly,
the parties that were not as dependent on corporate, union, and large
individual donations were disproportionately rewarded by the public
funding scheme.63 For example, Appendix I shows that Bloc fundraising
did not experience a material decline in revenues as a result of the
introduction of contribution limits. At the same time, Table 1, below,
shows that under the new public funding system, the Bloc has received
approximately $3 million per year in new funds. With the new public
62 Based on data from Ian Stewart, "Bill C-24: Replacing the Market with the State?"
Electoral Insight 7:1 (January 2005) 32 at 33. Note that data for election years is not available and is
not representative. The lines plotted connect data points in non-election years.
6? Indeed, some observers 'questioned whether the new funding system provided political
parties with too much money. See e.g. W.T. Stanbury, "Parties will be rolling in the dough" Hill
Times (17 February 2003).
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funding and its largely unaffected level of private funding, the Bloc is
much better financed than it ever was under the former regime. To a less
dramatic extent, the Conservative Party has also disproportionately
benefited from public funding because of its relative lack of dependence on
corporate contributions and its large number of small individual donations
as compared to its principal national rival, the Liberal Party. In essence,
the Bloc and the Conservatives are being compensated by the new public
funding scheme as if they had been as dependent on corporate contributions
and large individual donations as the Liberals were prior to 2004.
Table 1. Public Funding of Political Parties 2004-2006'
2004 2005 2006
Bloc 2,733,868 3,064,864 2,950,984
Conservative. 7,913,512 7,331,172 9,388,357
Liberal 9,141,408 9,087,333 8,572,965
NDP 2,883,919 3,879,817 4,611,140
D. Anecdotal Evidence of A voidance of Contribution Limits
The effectiveness of the limit on corporate and union contributions
is difficult to assess as there have been no enforcement actions against
political parties. Circumvention activities are also difficult to identify based
on fundraising statistics, especially given that there are only three years of
data. Accordingly, what follows is speculative and anecdotal.
The funds raised by political parties in 2004, an election year, were
significantly less than 2003, a non-election year. Without a change in the
law, the opposite result would be expected. The impact of the law, however,
may be exaggerated by unusually high donations in 2003 by corporations
and unions resulting from the efforts of political parties to raise as much
money as possible from these donors before the new rules came into effect
at the .beginning of 2004.65 If it may be assumed that for at least some
political parties the flow of funds from historical sources was stemmed and
some funding shortfall was experienced, there was some incentive to
circumvent the contribution limits. Continued complaints about the impact
of the limits even two years after the law was adopted suggest that at least
64 Data obtained from Elections Canada, online: <www.elections.ca>.
'Jansen & Young, "Solidarity Forever," supra note 55 at 16. A casual review of the largest
corporate and union donations in 2003 (Appendix I) and the total value of contributions to all
political parties (Appendix II) suggests that both political parties and their corporate and union
contributors were acting in anticipation of the pending contribution limits.
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some individuals within some political parties chafe under the restrictions
and have the motive, if nothing else, to develop avoidance strategies.66
Avoidance as a response to campaign finance regulation is a well
established phenomenon in the United States.67 The so-called "hydraulic
effect" likens the flow of money to the flow of water in a river. A dyke or
levee does not stop the flow of water, it simply creates pressure downstream
that will force the water around or over the river's banks. William Cross
predicted evasion of the Elections Act contribution limits using the more
colourful analogy of the "whack-a-mole" game often found at the midways
of country fairs.68 While limiting contributions created an incentive to avoid
the law, any legal avoidance would be small in scale compared to that seen
in the United States, because of the limited alternative ways in which funds
may be spent legally. For example, the limit on third party spending,
including spending on issue advocacy, which was held to be constitutional
by the Supreme Court in 2004, is a substantial impediment to the flow of
political funds into alternative channels.69
Information obtained in a survey of leading Canadian corporations
concerning attitudes toward political contributions completed shortly
before the adoption of the Elections Act also provides some insight into
the risk of evasion of a ban on political contributions.70 Although only
12% of corporations supported the ban on corporate contributions, a
further 37% supported some limit on corporate contributions, and there
was "solid majority support" for enhanced disclosure. Of the corporations
that made political contributions, 60% reported having a written policy
concerning these contributions. Even with broad support for some form of
increased regulation of corporate donations and a majority of corporations
internally regulating donations through written policies prior to the
See Graham Fox, "Rethinking Political Parties: Discussion Paper" (November 2005),
online: Public Policy Forum <http://www.ppforum.com/common/assets/publications/en/rethinking
political parties.pdf>. Fox notes (at 12-14) complaints about administrative burdens and the
difficulty of fundraising. See also Kady O'Malley, "Political financing bill remains 'fundamentally
controversial' after two years: political insiders" Hill Times (20 March 2006).
67 See Issacharoff & Karlan, "Campaign Finance Reform," supra note 40. See also
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) at 224, where Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, writing for the Court, picked up the hydraulic theme, noting that "[mloney, like water,
will always find an outlet" [McConnelI.
' 6 'William Cross, Political Parties (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) at 154.
69 Harper, supra note 5.
70 Nancy Averill & Bill Neville, "Corporate Political Contributions in Canada: Practices
and Perspectives" (February 2003), online: Public Policy Forum < http://www.ppforum.ca/common/
assets/publications/en/corporate%20political%20contributions%20in%20canada.pdf >.
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Elections Act, a minority of leading corporations could pose an avoidance
problem. If an effective avoidance strategy were.developed, it could put
pressure on even those corporations that support the enhanced regulation.
Anecdotal examples indicate some legal circumvention of limits
on corporate contributions between the 2003 Elections Act and the 2006
Accountability Act. In June 2006, ten executives of the Toronto
Dominion (TD) Bank announced that they were each making $5,000
donations to the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. The
executives explained that the donations were made on a non-partisan
basis to support the political process. However, the business purpose
and partisan nature of the donations was evident in the Chief Executive
Officer's comments; when asked why contributions were not being made
to the NDP, he explained that the NDP "doesn't like anything to do with
the financial services business."'" Also in the summer of 2006, in the
midst of the Liberal leadership campaign, donations by executives of
Apotex (a leading generic drug manufacturer), their spouses, and their
minor children became an issue. Each of the executives and their family
members donated the maximum individual amount of $5,400 with the
total donation amounting to $54,000.72 Although the donations complied
with the law, critics rightly questioned whether the children were used by
their parents, and implicitly by Apotex, to avoid the contribution limits. The
children's donations were returned as a result of the public pressure.73
The contributions by TD Bank and Apotex executives in 2006
may be isolated examples, or they may be indicative of a larger trend.
These examples are reminiscent of the phenomena that Louis
Massicotte has described as arising in response to the long-standing ban
on corporate political contributions at the provincial level in Quebec.74
Massicotte notes that in Quebec, individual donations are often
"camouflaged corporation donation[s]. '75 In some instances, he suggests,
n Sinclair Stewart & Paul Waldie, "On political donations, TD Bank breaks ranks" The
Globe andMail(12 June 2006) B1.
'2 Campbell Clark, "Twins, 11, donated $10,800 to Volpe's campaign; Liberal MP received
$5,400 from 14-year-old boy" The Globe and Mail(1 June 2006) Al.
I "Volpe returns controversial campaign donations" CTV News (2 June 2006), online:
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNewsstory/CTVNews/20060601/volpe-update-060601/20060602/>.
74 Louis Massicotte, "Financing Parties at the Grass-Roots Level: The Quebec
Experience" in K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, Party Funding and Campaign Financing in
International Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 153 at 175-76 [Ewing & Issacharoff, PartyFunding].
75 Ibid. at 175.
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the individual donations may be reimbursed by corporations through
bonuses.76 Massicotte's speculation recalls the Barbeau Committee's
remarks concerning the 1908-1930 corporate political contribution ban.
The Conservative Party also tested the boundaries of individual
contribution limits by not reporting fees paid by delegates to attend its 2004
leadership convention as contributions, and not counting these fees toward
the individual contribution limits. After a public dispute with the Chief
Electoral Officer, and with a ruling on the issue pending, the Conservative
Party amended its annual filings with Elections Canada and made refunds
to contributors who exceeded their limit as a result of convention fees.77
Another type of legal avoidance that could arise from the
contribution limits is the flow of corporate and union funds into third
party advertising campaigns. However, as noted above, spending limits
on third parties reduce the advantage that can be gained through this
type of redeployment of funds. The third party limit, however, only
applies to the campaign period that immediately precedes the election
(Le., from issuance of the writ to the election day). The Canadian Labour
Congress, formerly a significant donor to the NDP, ran a pre-writ public
advertising campaign in anticipation of the 2004 election.78 Pre-writ
advertising campaigns may become more common if corporations and
unions seek to find legal alternatives to contributions to political parties.
One informed observer noted in 2005 that the Elections Act
reforms were working well. 79 For the most part, this observation held
true through to the end of 2006 when the Accountability Act came into
effect. However, the examples of avoidance noted above suggest that
some legal circumvention of contribution limits and other political
finance rules was taking place. If the law had not changed, these
strategies might have become refined and entrenched. On this basis,
then, it might be argued that further reform was justified.
E. The 2006Accountability Act
Regardless of whether or not the reforms were effective, the
public's hunger for reform was not sated by the Elections Act. In 2004,
76 Ibid. at 176.
7 ,Conservatives admit to undisclosed donations" CTVNews (26 December 2006), online:
< http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061226/conservativesdonations061226/>.
'SJansen & Young, "Solidarity Forever," supra note 55 at 20.
' Heather Maclvor, "Shining a Harsh Light on Political Financing" Policy Options 26:6
(June 2005) 34 at 37.
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Paul Martin replaced Jean Chr6tien as Liberal leader and Prime
Minister. Eager to distance himself from the Sponsorship Scandal and
his predecessor, Martin appointed Justice John Gomery of the Quebec
Superior Court to head a commission of inquiry into the scandal (the
Gomery Commission). The appointment of the commission muted the
issue in the 2004 federal general election. The Martin Liberals emerged
from the election with a minority government.
The evidence before the Gomery Commission unfolded on
television through the second half of 2004 and into 2005. Public revulsion
grew as the story of advertising executives receiving money in brown
envelopes in a Montreal restaurant and other similar tales were told.
Most did not realize that the acts uncovered by the Gomery Commission
all took place before the Elections Act reforms. The opposition parties
took advantage of popular sentiment and attempted to bring down the
Martin government in a confidence vote in the spring of 2005. The
government earned a short reprieve when an opposition member crossed
the floor and the Prime Minister promised to call an election immediately
after the Gomery Commission issued its initial fact finding report."0
The Gomery Commission issued its fact finding report on
1 November 2005, 81 and a federal general election was called shortly
afterward for 23 January 2006. The campaign debate over government
accountability and political finance was conducted with the knowledge
that the Gomery Commission would make recommendations for reform
shortly after the election. The Conservative Party campaigned on a
platform that identified a limited number of priorities. High among
them was an "Accountability Act" that would deal with a range of issues,
including conflicts of interests, government contracting, protection for
whistleblowers, lobbying, and political finance.82 The Conservative Party
formed a minority government following the 2006 federal general
election, and the Gomery Commission's second report was released on
1 February 2006. The Commission's recommendations notably did not
include any changes to the political finance regime. Despite that
omission, the new government pressed forward with the reforms that it
8o "Conservative Stronach joins Liberals" CBC News (18 May 2005), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/05/17/stronach-liberalsO5O517.html>.
8) Commis.sion of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Who ,s
Responsible?: Fact Finding Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2005).
2"Stand Up for Canada": Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform, 2006.
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had proposed during the election campaign. Bill C-2, the Conservative
government's Accountability Act, was introduced in the House of
Commons for First Reading on 11 April 2006.
The Accountability Act proposed a number of changes relating
to political finance, including increased transparency for money donated
from trust funds and enhancement of enforcement provisions. The
individual contribution limit was reduced from $5,000 to $1,000 and
corporate and union contributions were banned.83 Unlike the 2003
Elections Act, the reduction in the capacity of political parties to raise
funds was not offset by increased public funding. This reduction in the
supply of money, without a corresponding reduction in demand, may
result in illegal evasion of the contribution limits. 84 The contribution
data set out in Appendix II suggest that this risk does not apply equally
to all political parties, as some parties can be expected to operate much
more effectively than others under the new rules.
Leading newspapers took opposite positions on whether the $1,000
limit was reasonable. 8 The Globe and Mail, noting the struggles of some
Liberal leadership candidates to raise funds, opined that "[p]olitics
should not be a game of begging."86 The lead Liberal spokesman on the
second reading of Bill C-2 suggested that the contribution limits were
too strict and had partisan effects.87 Accordingly, the Liberal-dominated
Senate amended the contribution limits from $1,000 to $2,000, but those
amendments were rejected by the House of Commons.88
Liberal Senators were quite correct that the proposed
Accountability Act had a partisan effect. Table 2 below shows the
importance of large individual contributions to the Liberal Party during the
period prior to the Accountability Act. The Liberal Party was significantly
more dependent on contributions over $1,000 than the other three main
'The $1,000 is indexed to inflation and was $1,100 in 2007. See online: <www.elections.ca>.
Note that the $1,000 contribution limit does not apply in the aggregate as the previous Elections Act
2003 limit did. An individual can effectively make three $1,000 contributions to a political party and its
constituent parts: one to each of the national party organization, a candidate endorsed by the political
party or local district party organization, and a leadership contestant of the political party.
' Heather Maclvor, "Limiting Donations and Eliminating Cash-Problem Solved? Not
Exactly" Policy Options 27:6 (June 2006) 34 at 36.
85See e.g. supra note 45.
s "Those fundraising blues" The Globe andMail(4 August 2006) A14.
' 7 House of Commons Debates, No. 009 (25 April 2006) at 1040 (Hon. Stephen Owen).
I Canada, Library of Parliament, Legislative Summary LS-522E, "Bill C-2: The Federal
Accountability Act" (Revised 23 November 2006) at 22.
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political parties. For example, in 2005 the Liberal Party obtained 44.5%
of its income from donors who contributed in excess of $1,000, and 28%
of its income from the portion of those donations that exceeded $1,000.
Based on the contribution patterns observed in the 2004-2006 period,
the imposition of a $1,000 contribution limit will likely have a negligible
impact on political parties other than the Liberal Party. Accordingly, the
great irony of the Accountability Act is that it harms the Liberal Party,
the party most likely to replace the governing Conservatives, thereby
making the Conservative Party less accountable to the electorate.
Table 2. Impact of Large Individual Contributions, 2004-200589
Political Party 2004 ($) 2005 ($)
Contributors Bloc 19 21
>$1,0009° Conservative 731 930
Liberal 585 1368
NDP 339 350
Total Bloc 858,746 734,729
Contributions ($) Conservative 10,910,320 17,847,451
Liberal 4,719,388 8,344,162
NDP 5,194,170 5,120,827
Value of Bloc 37,736 (4.4%) 32,289 (4.4%)
Contributions Conservative 1,554,955 (14.3%) 1,968,882 (11%)
>$1,000 Liberal 1,499,743 (31.8%) 3,715,972 (44.5%)
NDP 600,522 (11.6%) 597,928 (11.7%)
Impact of Notional Bloc (18,736) (-2.1%) (11,289) (-1.5%)
$1,000 Conservative (823,955) (-7.6%) (1,038,882) (-5.8%)
Contribution Liberal (914,743) (-19.4%) (2,347,972) (-28.1%)
Limit9' NDP (261,522) (-5%) (247,928) (-4.8%)
89 All figures taken from Part 2(a), Statement of Contributions Received-Details of
Contributions from Individuals, Registered Party Financial Transactions Returns, Elections
Canada, online: <www.elections.ca>.
9'The raw data in the Registered Party Transactions Returns lists individual contributions,
not total contributions by individual contributors. Accordingly, the number of contributors
contributing in excess of $1,000 and the value of contributions in excess of $1,000 were identified
using the following procedure: (1) identify individuals recorded to have made multiple
contributions; (2) aggregate contributions by individuals making multiple contributions; and (3)
identify those individuals making annual contributions that in aggregate are in excess of $1,000, and
total the value of those contributions. The author thanks Claire Pater for her database assistance.
9' The notional impact of the $1000 cap is calculated by taking the number of contributors
over $1000 and multiplying by $1000 to get their maximum permitted contribution under a $1000
cap. That number is then subtracted from the sum actually contributed by individuals who
contributed over $1000 to come up with an amount exceeding the notional cap that would have
been lost if the cap had existed. The percentage indicated in parentheses is the percentage of total
dollars contributed that would be lost under a cap.
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The Accountability Act was passed with the unanimous support
of all political parties.92 The political finance provisions of the
Accountability Act came into force on 1 January 2007.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PARTISAN RULE-MAKING
A. Democratic Norms in Charter Jurisprudence
The Secession Reference proclaimed that "[t]he principle of
democracy has always informed the design of our constitutional structure,
and continues to act as an essential interpretive consideration to this day."93
The problem with this pronouncement is that democracy is a contested
concept.94 The Supreme Court of Canada seemed to recognize this in
Figueroa v. Canada when it stated, albeit in obiter, that the Charter does
not favour one political system over another. This begs the question,
what kind of democracy informs Charter analysis? And, for that matter,
where is it found? In the second part of this section, I outline an approach
to Charter review which suggests that the Court defer to Parliament's
assessment of democratic norms and focus instead on procedural fairness.
In the meantime, certain democratic norms provide clues as to how the
Elections Act and Accountability Act provisions might be viewed.
Elsewhere I have argued that cases arising under sections 2(b) and
(d), section 3, and section 15 of the Charter, and cases touching upon rules
governing the democratic process, comprise a Charterjurisprudence of the
democratic process.96 Bringing these cases together reveals common themes
that are not apparent when the issues are relegated to separate doctrinal
silos. Viewed in this way, Canada's democratic process jurisprudence
identifies a number of norms that guide analysis of any provision governing
this process. Given that most of these cases are decided under section I,"
which explicitly refers to limits that are justifiable in a "democratic
9 2 House of Commons Debates, No. 094 (8 December 2006) at 1005-35.
3 Secession Reference, supra note 30 at para. 62.
W .B. Gallic, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 167 at 183ff.
9 Figueroa v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 at para. 81 [Figueroa].
Feasby, "Freedom of Expression," supra note 8.
9 A notable exception is Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [ 1991] 2
S.C.R. 158, where the Court imported a balancing analysis into its definition of the scope of the
right protected by s. 3 of the Charter.
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society," a unified approach makes sense. The democratic principles that
are of most concern in the context of this article are as follows:
1. Majoritarianism-The Secession Reference makes clear that at
its most abstract level, Canadian democracy is majoritarian in nature.9 At
the local constituency level, this means that the candidate with the most
votes is elected to Parliament. At the national level, subject to the
geographical distribution of support, the majoritarian principle means
that the political party with the most support should form the
government. Certain other democratic principles are derivative of the
majoritarian principle-egalitarianism, legitimacy, and accountability.
(a) Egalitarianism-For the most part, the Court has pursued
democracy's majoritarian goals under the rubric of the "egalitarian model."
If majoritarian preferences are to prevail, there must be relative parity
between each citizen's vote.99 "Deliberative equality," as I have labelled it
elsewhere, not only requires roughly equally weighted votes, but also controls
that prevent economic. advantage from being readily converted to political
advantage through, for example, the domination of democratic debate. 10
The Court in R. v. Bryan'" went farther to indicate that Parliament may
act to promote some measure of informational equality between citizens.
(b) Legitimacy--Belief in the legitimacy of the outcome of the
democratic process is integral to the rule of law, as it leads citizens to
obey the laws enacted by the government. The most important quality of
a government in a majoritarian system is to be seen by citizens to
represent the majority preference. The problem with legitimacy as a
consideration for courts is that there may be considerations other than
majoritarianism that affect the public's concept of legitimacy. As such,
giving weight to legitimacy risks introducing irrational considerations
into constitutional analysis and should be done with great caution.
(c) Accountabilily--This democratic value has not been
judicially considered, but it is a motivating factor behind the new
political finance regime and is implicit in the Chartefs section 4(1)
provision for the maximum term of Parliament. Majoritarianism is of no
98These democratic principles must be viewed within the larger context of principles set out
in the Secession Reference, supra note 30.
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), supra note 97 at paras. 48-57.
"t Colin Feasby, "Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in the United Kingdom and Canada"
(2003) McGill L.J. 11 at 17.
1-/2007 SCC 12 [Bryan].
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value without accountability moments that provide an opportunity to
replace a government or defeat its individual members.112 This requires
an electoral system that is not tilted to favour certain kinds of candidates
or one political party over another. The greatest risk to accountability is
partisan legislation designed to favour the success of incumbents
generally and, in particular, the governing political party."3
2 Free debate--Democracy requires open discussion and debate.
This openness fulfills both an abstract civic purpose and an instrumental
purpose. From a civic perspective, citizen participation in democratic
debate has an intrinsic value. The Court in Figueroa endorsed the concept
of "meaningful participation," which, in that case, was found to trump
structural interests advanced by the government (ie., promotion of the
formation of majority governments). From an instrumental perspective,
the best ideas, best candidates, or best parties should prevail in an open
marketplace for expression, thus enhancing the prospect of good
government. The view of Parliament and the Supreme Court has been
that open debate does not mean deregulation of electoral expression;
rather, it is consistent with certain limits during an election period and
state-financed expression so long as it is provided on equal terms to all.'0 4
While the democratic norms above can be identified in the case
law, it is much more difficult looking forward to determine which norms
should prevail in future cases when they come into conflict. If anything,
Canada's democratic process jurisprudence demonstrates a need for a
principled approach to determine priority among democratic norms in
each case. As will be explained in the next section, this is really a question
of the allocation of responsibility between the Court and Parliament in
overseeing the functioning of the democratic process and of the deference
(or lack thereof) that the Court should accord to Parliament.
B. Charter Review of Rules Governing the Democratic Process
The overly deferential approach favoured by the Supreme Court
in two recent democratic process cases, Harper and Bryan, suggests that
"- See Rebecca L. Brown, "Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution" (1998) 98
Colum. L. Rev. 531.
103 It is important to note that in addition to partisan manipulation of electoral rules, there
is the possibility of bipartisan collusion. See e.g. Samuel Issacharoff, "Gerrymandering and Political
Cartels" (2002) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593.
"o4 See generally Harper, supra note 5 and Figueroa, supra note 95.
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the Court seeks to limit its role in the supervision of the democratic
process. This will constrain the Court's ability to rectify abuses and may
even invite manipulation of the rules that govern the democratic process.
I have previously outlined a preferable approach to judicial review of
rules governing the democratic process under the Charter that I have
dubbed "process theory lite."" °5 My approach, unlike the Court's current
deferential approach, would require that under section 1 of the Charter,
the Court consider Parliament's fundamental conflict of interest, in that
the government is both regulating the political process and is the product
of that process. Parliament's conflict of interest and the risk of partisan
rule-making is of special relevance to the political finance regime brought
into existence by the 2003 Elections Act and the 2006 AccountabilityAct.
The Court's reasoning in Harper and Bryan shows a disturbing
tendency toward unreflective deference. Justice Fish's admonition in
Bryan is representative of the majority approach in both cases and is
most worrisome; specifically, he states: "[W]e must be particularly
careful not to usurp Parliament's role in determining the rules of the
electoral game most appropriate for Canada as a whole."'10 6 Justice
Abella, who wrote for the minority in Bryan, was chastised by Justice
Bastarache for "ignor[ing] yet again the contextual and deferential
approach contemplated in the recent jurisprudence of this Court."107
The extreme deference of the majorities in Harper and Bryan is a
departure from the more measured approach found in Libman,
Figueroa, and other earlier cases.
According to Justice Bastarache in Thomson Newspapers v.
Canada (A. G.), the level of deference to be accorded Parliament is
determined after considering four contextual factors: (1) the nature of
the harm and the inability to measure it; (2) the vulnerability of the
group protected; (3) subjective fears and apprehension of harm; and (4)
the nature of the infringed activity. °8 The contextual factors identified
103 The name acknowledges the intellectual debt owed to John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) [Ely,
Democracy and Distrust], and also to later proponents of process theory in the US context. See e.g.
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, "Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process" (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643 [Issacharoff & Pildes, "Politics as Markets"]; Richard H.
Pildes, "The Theory of Political Competition" (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605.
" Bryan, supra note 101 at para. 58.
"' Ibid. at para. 50.
1-5 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 at paras. 90-96 [ Thomson Newspapers].
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by Justice Bastarache are deployed as a rote approach in Harper and
Bryan to determine the appropriate level of deference to Parliament.
However, these contextual factors alone are inadequate to determine
the applicable standard of review.
The problem with Justice Bastarache's contextual approach is that
it is entirely blind to one of the most important contextual factors:
Parliament's inherent conflict of interest in regulating the political
process."9 Legislative conflict of interest in regulating the democratic
process is not a novel concept. The idea of a gerrymander-the
manipulation of electoral boundaries for partisan or other purposes-dates
back to at least the early nineteenth century.10 Gerrymanders, however, are
hardly the only way to manipulate the democratic process for partisan
purposes. Political finance regulations and other controls on political
expression provide similar opportunities to obtain partisan advantage."'
Political scientists, particularly public choice scholars, and US legal
commentators who favour a more process-based approach to judicial
review, have long recognized this risk. They argue that the self-interest of
legislators justifies close scrutiny of rules governing the political process.
John Ely envisioned courts, through constitutional review, exercising
something akin to a regulatory role to ensure that democratic process is
open and that political competition remains robust."' Richard Pildes
expressed this view and suggested that it has application beyond the US
context: "[C]onstitutional law must play a role in constraining partisan or
incumbent self-entrenchment that inappropriately manipulates the ground
rules of democracy. That functional justification for judicial review will be
present in all constitutional democracies. '"113
The question in the Canadian context is how to account for
Parliament's self-interest in Cbarterreview of rules governing the democratic
'09 Note that Bryan, supra note 101, was a rare democratic process case in that it did not
raise any issue of conflict of interest. There is no reasonable argument that can be made that the
self-interest of any members of Parliament was served by restricting access to eastern election
results in more western parts of the country before voting ended. There are, of course, other good
arguments that can and were made against this, but the Supreme Court of Canada deferred to
Parliament's judgment in the matter.
"' Our first Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, was a noted practitioner of the art. See
generally R. MacGregor Dawson, "The Gerrymander of 1882" (1935) 1 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 197.
.. Issacharoff & Pildes, "Politics as Markets," supra note 105 at 688-90.
2 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 105 at 102-03.
113 Richard H. Pildes, "The Supreme Court 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization
of Democratic Politics" (2004) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29 at 154.
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process. I have previously offered as my answer a two-step approach. First,
Parliament, being a majoritarian institution, is acknowledged to be better
placed than the courts to determine the principles that should inform the
regulation of the democratic process; only in the most extreme
circumstances would it be appropriate for a court to prefer its conception of
democracy over one clearly expressed by Parliament." 4 In practical terms,
this means that at the first stage of the section 1 analysis, courts should
defer to Parliament's assessment of whether or not legislation addresses a
pressing and substantial objective. Second, Parliament's conflict of interest
in regulating the democratic process requires courts to be vigilant in
assessing the means chosen by Parliament to implement its objectives. This
means, in practice, that courts should not defer to Parliament in their
assessment of proportionality."5 A strict application of the proportionality
aspects of the section 1 test, especially minimal impairment, will
significantly reduce the risk of partisan and self-interested rule-making.
My approach is generally consistent with the approach favoured
by the Supreme Court in democratic process cases prior to Harper and
with the dissenting reasons in Harper and Bryan. The best example is
Libman, where the Supreme Court deferred to the Quebec legislature's
assertion that some form of spending limits was necessary to achieve its
democratic vision, but rejected the absurdly low limits imposed. This
approach is echoed by Justice Breyer of the US Supreme Court in his
extra-judicial writing and recent decisions."6
The Supreme Court of Canada might, of course, never adopt my
approach. However, it is almost inconceivable that the Court will remain
oblivious to the risk of self-interested and partisan rule-making. In
analyzing the two statutes that are the focus of this article, I contend
114 The court however, must retain the power and discretion to intervene if Parliament
sanctions a clearly anti-democratic norm.
" This is certainly true of the rational connection and minimal impairment parts of the
proportionality analysis. An argument may be made that in balancing the salutary and deleterious effects
in the last phase of the proportionality analysis, some credit should be given to Parliament's assessment of
the salutary effects of the legislation, as that evaluation often mirrors the analysis undertaken in
connection with determining whether an objective is pressing and substantial. Parliament, however, is
poorly suited to evaluating the deleterious effects of rules governing the democratic process, as it may be
blind (wilfully or otherwise) to the anti-competitive and anti-democratic aspects of such rules.
" See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty. Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (New
York: Knopf, 2005) at 49. Cass Sunstein has observed that Breyer's approach to judicial review, at
least in so far as it emphasizes democracy as an interpretive principle, resembles Ely's. See Cass
Sunstein, "Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism" (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1719 at 1720.
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that, in some form or another, the Court will be more sensitive to the
problem of partisan self-interest in its future analysis of rules governing
the political process.
V. US CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Relevance of the US Experience
Canada's political finance jurisprudence is peculiar. The battles
over the constitutionality of the political finance regime have been fought
by third parties (ie., interest groups) and minor political parties."7 These
contests at the margins of the system have been treated by courts as
proxies for the constitutionality of the system as a whole." 8 Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Canada's leading political finance decisions implicitly
assume the constitutionality of the system in general and spending limits
on political parties in particular. However, the constitutionality of the
main device of the 1974 political finance regime-spending limits on
political parties and candidates-has never actually been tested. Similarly,
neither the contribution limits in the 2003 Elections Act nor any
provincial contribution limits have been challenged.
In 1976 and again in 2006, the US Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of political finance regimes featuring both spending
limits and contribution limits." 9 No other democracy has confronted the
constitutionality of spending limits and contribution limits in tandem.
The differences between Canada and the United States in terms of
political culture and constitutional and legal structures give ample
reason to be cautious when considering the reasoning of US courts and
legal scholars for the Canadian context. Even so, the grafting of
contribution limits on to Canada's spending limit-based political finance
system makes the American experience with contribution limits and
spending limits of special interest. The US Supreme Court decisions
" 7 See National Citizens' Coalition, supra note 27; Somerville, supra note 27, Libman, supra note
7; Pacific Press v. Bntish Columbia (A.G.), [2000] 5 W.W.R. 219 (B.C.S.C.); Harper, supra note 5;
Figuero, supra note 95; and Longley, supra note 44. On the constitutional status of minor political
parties before Figueroa, see: Heather Maclvor, "Judicial Review and Electoral Democracy: The
Contested Status of Political Parties Under the Charter" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 479.
n' Feasby, "Freedom of Expression," supra note 8 at 237. See also Harper, supra note 5 at
para. 102, where the Court held that "protecting the integrity of spending limits applicable to
candidates and parties is a pressing and substantial objective."
uS' Buckley, supra note 10; Randall, supra note 11.
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identify and debate many of the key issues that would be raised in any
constitutional challenge of Canada's new political finance regime.
Identifying and understanding these key issues facilitates informed
consideration of how they might be resolved in the Canadian context.
The United States' long tradition of regulating corporate and union
participation and the constitutional jurisprudence that has resulted may also
provide insight into issues surrounding Canada's new limits on corporations
and unions. Even recognizing that, in practice, the effectiveness of US limits
is questionable given the various loopholes available, the justifications
offered for limiting corporate and union political activity in the US
jurisprudence are noteworthy. As with spending limits and contribution
limits generally, the richness of US jurisprudence in this area stands in stark
contrast to the jurisprudence on these issues in other major democracies.
B. Contribution and Spending Limit Cases
1. Buckleyv. Valeo(1976)
In 1974, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, a political
finance system featuring contribution limits, spending limits, and public
financing for presidential campaigns was adopted.12 The contribution
limits and spending limits were promptly challenged in Buckley,2 ' a
decision which has set the parameters of US legislation, jurisprudence,
and debate since 1976.122
The defenders of the new political finance system contended in
Buckley that contribution limits and spending limits were necessary to
prevent corruption. A secondary goal, the promotion of equality, was
also asserted. Noting "disturbing examples" from the 1972 election, the
US Supreme Court accepted that preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption was an important legislative objective and that
contribution limits logically furthered that objective.2 2 Reasonable
limits on contributions were not found to pose a significant risk to First
Amendment values such as open and robust political debate. This
120 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as am. by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,88 Stat. 1263,2 U.S.C. § 431ff.
121 Buckley, supra note 10.
122 See e.g. Richard L. Hasen, "Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley. The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission" (2004) 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 31.
'23 Buckley, supra note 10 at paras. 17-18.
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conclusion depended in significant part on the view that a contribution,
which is fundamentally a financial exchange, has limited expressive
content beyond the mere fact of being made.' 24 The decision cautioned
that contribution limits might pose First Amendment concerns "if the
limitations prevented candidates and political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy,"' 5 and
observed that contribution limits "impinge on protected associational
freedoms.', 126 Despite those concerns, the cases following Buckley
subjected contribution limits to "closely drawn" scrutiny rather than the
more onerous standard of "strict scrutiny" usually applied to
expenditure limits. ,27
By contrast, spending limits were found to directly undermine
the First Amendment. The US Supreme Court held that "[t]he
expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech.' ' 128 The anti-corruption rationale was inadequate to
justify the spending limits: "[T]he independent advocacy restricted by
the provision does not presently appear to pose the dangers of real or
apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions.', 29 Though this view appeared to soften in McConnell,
where spending limits on issue advocacy survived a constitutional
challenge, the Buckley formula was reaffirmed in Randallin 2006.13°
Having found the anti-corruption rationale sufficient to justify
contribution limits but inadequate to support spending limits, the judges
in Buckley then considered whether the secondary objective, promotion
of equality, had any merit. They dismissed that objective in categorical
terms, holding that "the concept that government may restrict the speech
124 According to the majority opinion, "A contribution serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for support. The quantity
of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since
the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." See ibid at para. 14.
125 Ibid.
126Ibid. at para. 22.
2
' McConnell, supra note 67 at 137, per Stevens and O'Connor JJ. (writing for the court):
"The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely
drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise."
128 Buckley, supra note 10 at para. 13.
'
2 Ibid. at para. 36.
'3oIbid.; Randall, supra note 11.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment... .""' The decision noted
that the financial ability of individuals to participate in public debate is
not a relevant First Amendment concern. This inflexible position eroded
in subsequent cases, as the distinction between anti-corruption and the
promotion of equality has proved difficult to sustain both in theory and in
practice. As will be discussed, the equality rationale partly explains why
limits on corporate and union political activity have been sustained in some
cases. Indeed, it has been suggested that the equality rationale is at work in
many campaign finance cases, even when it is not explicitly acknowledged.'32
2. Randall v. Sorrel! (2006)
Thirty years after Buckley the US Supreme Court revisited the
constitutionality of contribution and spending limits in Randall. The
political finance regime in issue was adopted by Vermont in 1997 and
shared two main features with the Canadian political finance system after
the adoption of the 2003 Elections Act-contribution limits and spending
limits.'33 Randallprovided the opportunity to assess the constitutionality
of spending limits in light of the post-Buckleyexperience.
Two main submissions were made in support of spending limits.
First, it was contended that the "[p]ost-Buckley experience ... has shown
that contribution limits (and disclosure requirements) alone cannot
effectively deter corruption or its appearance; hence experience has
undermined an assumption underlying that case." '134 Second, it was asserted
that fundraising has become an all consuming enterprise that distracts
elected officeholders from their duties as legislators and representatives.'35
Bucklejs rejection of the equality rationale was not directly attacked.
t Buckley, supra note 10 at para. 38.
'3 See e.g. David A. Strauss, "Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform" (1994)
94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369 at 1369 and at n. 1; Richard Briffault, "The Return of Spending Limits:
Campaign Finance Reform After Landell v. Sorrell' (2005) 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 399 at 438.
13 Aside from the differences in amounts, the Vermont law did not consider expenditures
of a candidate's own money to be "contributions," and the Vermont law sought to correct the
advantages of incumbents by limiting incumbents' expenditures to 85% or 90% of the spending
limit depending on the office.
' Randall, supra note 11 at 4439 (Breyer J., majority opinion).
'Ilbid. For a more detailed elaboration of this argument, see Vincent Blasi, "Free Speech
and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the
First Amendment After All" (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1281.
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The plurality decision written by Justice Breyer rejected the first
contention. Justice Breyer's reasons indicate that for spending limits to be
constitutional it must first be shown that contribution limits are insufficient
to prevent corruption. Justice Breyer, writing for himself and the Chief
Justice, held that political finance issues had not changed radically since
Buckley and certainly not enough to undermine the Court's conclusions in
that cas6.'36 His reasons seem to embody two ideas. First, he suggests that
since the problem has not changed in nature or scope, the remedy upheld
in Buckley---contribution limits-should continue to suffice; meanwhile,
the remedy found unconstitutional in Buckley--spending limits-should
remain unconstitutional. Second, Justice Breyer's finding is in part an
application of the preference for the least drastic means. Buckleyheld that
contribution limits are less problematic than spending limits; therefore, it
stands to reason that contribution limits should be used before spending
limits. Justice Souter expressed a similar view in dissent when he remarked
that "the Buckley court did not categorically foreclose the possibility that
some spending limit might comport with the First Amendment.'
' 37
Justice Breyer also found the alternative justification for
spending limits unpersuasive. The amount of time devoted by elected
officials to fundraising, despite the conclusion of Justice Souter in
dissent, was considered in Buckley and rejected as a compelling
objective.' 38 Justice Breyer declined to overrule Buckleyon this point.
Vermont's contribution limits were also unconstitutional. Justice
Breyer prescribed a two-stage inquiry to assess the constitutionality of
contribution limits. First, following Buckley, he asked whether the
"contribution limits prevent candidates from 'amassing the resources
necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy."" 39 He then asked
"whether they magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where
they put challengers to a significant disadvantage. "40 Justice Breyer's
conclusion that the Vermont contribution limits were unconstitutional is
not surprising, given that the limits were very low compared to limits in
other States and were not indexed for inflation.'"'
136 Randall, ibid. at 4439-40.
"I Ibid. at 4451 (Souter J., concurring).
8 Ibid. at 4440 (Breyer J.) and at 4451 (Souter J.).
1 Ibid. at 4440 (Breyer J.).
140 Ibid.
14' But see Richard Briffault, "A Changing Supreme Court Considers Major Campaign
Finance Questions: Randall v. Sorrell, and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC' (2006) Election L.J. 74
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Justice Breyer's concern that contribution limits not be allowed
to magnify the natural advantages of incumbency is consistent with the
approach that I recommend for adjudicating democratic process issues
under the Charter. Justice Breyer objects to the use of legislative power
to entrench incumbents. Put differently, he objects to partisan rule-
making in the context of the democratic process. This view is also
reminiscent of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach in Figueroa
where minor political parties were denied access to certain advantages
afforded to major political parties.
C. Corporations, Unions, and Political Finance Restrictions
The United States has a long tradition of regulating corporate and
union political contributions and expenditures. This impulse for regulation
dates back to the progressive movement of the early twentieth century.
The Tillman Act of 1907 imposed a ban on political contributions by
corporations.142 The traditional view, expressed by Justice Souter in Federal
Election Commission v. Beaumont in 2002, is that the Tillman Act was a
legislative response to a popular movement inspired by Theodore
Roosevelt to curtail corporate political influence.'43 Despite Justice Souter's
explanation that the Tillman Act sought to free elections from corruption
by corporate money, other rationales for the regulation of corporate and
union contributions and expenditures can be identified. For example,
Justice Frankfurter set out a democratizing rationale for the Tillman Act in
United States v. UA W-CIO.1" He wrote that the "underlying philosophy
was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a
at 81, noting the Second Circuit's finding that the contribution limits were "sufficiently high to
permit effective campaigning."
1422 U.S.C. § 441b(2), 34 Stat. 864, Ch. 420-
143 Federal Elections Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) at 152:
The current law grew out of a "popular feeling" in the late 19th century "that aggregated capital unduly
influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption." A demand for congressional action
gathered force in the campaign of 1904, which made a national issue of the political leverage exerted
through corporate contributions, and after the election and new revelations of corporate political
overreaching, President Theodore Roosevelt made banning corporate political contributions a legislative
priority.... [T]he momentum was "for elections 'free from the power of money,"' and Congress acted on
the President's call for an outright ban, not with half measures, but with the Tillman Act.
Souter J.'s rendition of the history behind the Ti7man Act represents the conventional wisdom.
However, others offer a more nuanced story. See e.g. John R. Bolton, "Constitutional Limitations on
Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech" (1980) 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 373 at 375-81.
'- 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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democracy for the wise conduct of government."'45 This reflects the
sentiment that the right to make political contributions should be limited to
those who have the right to vote or are capable of obtaining the right to vote
by achieving the age of majority or seeking naturalization. Another purpose
of the Tillman Act was to stop corporations from using shareholders' funds
for political purposes that they may not support. Adam Winkler contends
that this animating purpose can be found in all subsequent restrictions on
corporate political activity and that the same rationale informs restrictions
on union activity.'46 Winkler provides the most cogent explanation as to
why corporations and unions are often subject to the same rules. Absent
the shareholder and dues payer protection rationales, the only plausible
reason for treating corporations and unions the same way is that they are
traditional adversaries and that fairness requires equal treatment.
47
Whatever the purpose of limiting corporate and union political
activity may be, there is a general acceptance that the prohibition of
direct corporate and union political contributions to candidates is
constitutionally permissible. To be sure, many devices have emerged to
facilitate the use of corporate and union funds for the indirect support
of candidates-most notably funding the overhead for political action
committees (PACs). Indeed, much of the recent litigation has concerned
independent expenditures of corporations and unions and whether PACs
that depend on corporations or unions to fund some of their costs can be
limited in their activities. 4 ' Implicit in these challenges is an acceptance of
limits on the direct political involvement of corporations and unions."'
The US approach to judicial review of expenditure limits is, for the
most part, less deferential than that in Canada. Buckley and Randall both
apply a stricter standard of review than leading Canadian expenditure
limit cases. One of the early cases concerning corporate expenditure
'41 Ibid. at 575.
146 Adam Winkler, "'Other People's Money': Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law" (2004) 92 Geo. L.J. 871 [Winkler, "Other People's Money"].
"' See e.g. David J. Sousa, "'No Balance in the Equities': Union Power in Making and
Unmaking of the Campaign Finance Regime" (1999) Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 374, discussing the idea
of "balance" between business and labour that has informed US campaign finance legislation since
the 1940s. Note that Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) at 666
provides some justification for the differential treatment of corporations and unions [Austin].
'
48 See e.g. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PA C 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
See McConnell, supra note 67 at 203.
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limits, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,'5 ° involved corporate
expenditures in a referendum and adopted a strict approach, partly as a
result of the inapplicability of the anti-corruption rationale in the context
of referenda. 5' Despite favouring a strict standard of review for spending
limits generally and for corporations in the specific context of referenda,
the US Supreme Court occasionally defers to legislative judgment in the
context of spending limits on PACs associated with corporations and
unions.152 A leading example of this is Austin v. Michigan State Chamber
of Commerce,153 where a restriction on the expenditure of corporate
funds on campaign advertising was upheld.
The US Supreme Court is less deferential when dealing with
limits on non-profit interest groups. In Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.,154 Justice Brennan wrote that a
corporation formed for the sole purpose of engaging in political advocacy
did not pose the same threat as a corporation formed for the purpose of
amassing capital.1 5 Accordingly, the restrictions on expenditures on such
companies were held to be unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court
reaffirmed its approach to non-profit interest groups in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,'56 which was a challenge to
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act limits on interest group advocacy
that were largely upheld in McConnell. In this case, the court took an
approach that some commentators viewed as being tantamount to
overruling the conclusion in McConnell.15 7 Despite the conflicting signals,
150435 U.S. 765 (1978).
s Ibid. at 789. See also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981) at 297-98, where the same approach was taken in the context of contributions in a referendum.
152 For example, in considering expenditures made by a non-profit corporation in soliciting
contributions in Federa Election Conmision v Natonal Ri'ght to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982),
Chief Justice Rehnquist held at 209: "[Clareful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws in a
'cautious advance, step by step,' to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations
and labor organizations warrants considerable deference" [National Right to Work Committee].
' 3 Supra note 147.
l54 79 U.S. 238 (1986). The reversal of direction from Natonal'Right to Work Committee, supra
note 152, may be attributable to the nature of the two organizations, one being a genuine membership
organization and the other being a group of donors masquerading as a membership organization.
'- Ibid. at 259.
'
56
127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
157 Richard L. Hasen, "Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life' (July 2007) Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-33, online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1003922>.
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limits on for-profit corporations and unions (or their associated PACs)
are more likely to get an easy ride from the US judiciary than limits on
individuals or interest groups.
VI. THREE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A.. Are Individual Contribution Limits Unconstitutional?
1. Expressive Nature of Contributions and Egalitarian Objectives
The idea that political contributions carry less expressive content
than political expenditures is not persuasive on the preliminary question
of whether freedom of expression has been infringed. The threshold for
violating section 2(b) is low; most human acts other than violent acts are
considered expressive and most limits accordingly infringe the guarantee.
1 58
As a result, it is almost trite to observe that contribution limits breach
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. The real question
is whether contribution limits can be justified under section 1 of the
Charter In this part of the Charter analysis the question of expressive
content is relevant.
The first question to consider in the context of section 1 is the
nature of the objective of the impugned law. The Supreme Court of
Canada has characterized the overall objective of election laws to be
fairness. Central to the objective of fairness is a concept of equality.
Indeed, the Court in Harper described the Canadian approach to
election regulation to be an egalitarian model,'59 which holds that subject
to differences in individual talents, citizens should have a roughly equal
influence on the outcome of the electoral process. This requires roughly
equally weighted votes and constraints on the use of private wealth in
the electoral arena.
Contribution limits further egalitarian objectives and are a more
direct and effective tool for levelling influence on the political process than
spending limits. Even a contribution limit of $1,000 permits the wealthy to
'See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at para. 43.
'-5 Harper, supra note 5 at para. 62. On the political theory and objectives of Canadian
political finance legislation, see Colin Feasby, "Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of
the Process of Democracy under the Charter. The Emerging Egalitarian Model" (1999) 44 McGill L.J.
5; Andrew Geddis, "Libert6, Egalit6, Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the Charte"' (2004)
42 Alta. L. Rev. 429; and Andrew C. Geddis, "Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent
Expenditures: A Comparative View" (2001) 9 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 5.
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obtain more influence than the poor. Nevertheless, when contributions are
limited to $1,000, influence is necessarily spread thinly over a much
larger pool of donors than when contributions sizes are unlimited. The
contribution limit system in the Accountability Act is, then, more
democratic and more egalitarian than a system without contribution limits.
Although the contributions limits in the Elections Act and
Accountability Act can be justified in egalitarian terms, they were in
actuality a response to the corruption in the Sponsorship Program and
the perception that large donors, corporations, and unions enjoyed
improper political influence. Anti-corruption has long been a motivating
factor for Canadian election regulation, but it has not been the focus of
judicial comment in the Charter era. However, the US courts have
repeatedly found that the prevention of corruption is a worthwhile
objective of election laws. Given that contribution limits both promote
egalitarian objectives and combat corruption, there can be little doubt
that the first branch of the section 1 test-the existence of a pressing
and substantial objective-is met.
2. Proportionality and Partisan Bias
The real test for the Accountability Act contribution limits is
whether they satisfy the proportionality aspects of the section 1 analysis.
The Supreme Court has taken an inconsistent approach to the
proportionality analysis in recent democratic process cases. As noted in
Part IV, I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court's democratic
process jurisprudence before Harper was characterized by deference to
the philosophical objectives of Parliament, but critical assessment of the
means used to achieve those objectives.16 ° Most often, this approach
leads to a critical evaluation of the means employed to achieve an
objective in the context of the "minimal impairment" test. However, the
Court in Harper took a deferential approach to the evaluation of third
party spending limits even at the minimal impairment stage of the
section 1 analysis.16' In the context of contribution limits, such a
deferential approach could be rationalized by following the US example
in finding that contributions carry less expressive value than
expenditures. In the same way that the US courts use closely drawn
" Feasby, "Freedom of Expression," supra note 8 at 282-86.
161 Harper, supra note 5 at para. 111.
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scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny to evaluate contribution limits, the
Supreme Court of Canada could defer to the judgment of Parliament's
estimation of the need for, and level of, contribution limits.
As explained above, when a partisan impact or incumbent-
entrenching effect of a democratic process rule is identified, a court
should adopt a critical view and demand compelling justification for the
rule. 162 Contribution limits are an interesting test for this approach. The
$5,000 contribution limit in the Elections Act disproportionately affected
the Liberals, who were the majority government at the time the limit was
adopted. What, if anything, is a court to make of the fact that the
contribution limit was so obviously contrary to the Liberals' self-interest?
The natural normative conclusion is that it must be a good law because
the government would not act contrary to its partisan interest without a
compelling reason. The question, though interesting, is moot given the
passage of even more strict contribution limits under the leadership of the
Conservatives in 2006.
The contribution limits in the 2006 Accountability Act, as shown
above in Table 2, are only to the significant prejudice of the Liberal
Party. When the new contribution limits were proposed by the
Conservatives, neither they nor the Bloc or NDP could reasonably have
expected to suffer any real disadvantage as a result of the changes. As
such, the 2006 contribution limits are a classic example of self-serving
rule-making. Accepting for the moment that some form of contribution
limits is constitutional, the Conservatives' self-interested change to the
law should be carefully scrutinized. If my recommended approach or
another approach with sensitivity to Parliamentary conflicts of interest
were followed, the Liberal Party would be able to make a credible
argument that the $1,000 contribution limit should be struck down as
unconstitutional. This argument would be more credible if a challenge
was brought by the Liberal Party organization that opposed the
introduction of contribution limits rather than by Liberal Members of
" 2 Christopher D. Bredt and Laura Pottie argue that the court should be even more exacting than I
suggest. See "Liberty, Equality and Deference: A Comment on Colin Feasby's 'Freedom of Expression
and the Law of the Democratic Process' (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 291 at 292 [emphasis in original]:
[W]e believe that a healthy dose of judicial scepticism is particularly warranted in respect of
regulation of advocacy within the electoral context. Experience has demonstrated a clear tendency
for Parliament to enact legislation that preserves the status quo by giving preferential access to
resources to incumbents and/or large established parties. This tendency should be balanced by a
requirement for convincing evidence when justifying restrictions on participation in an election.
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Parliament that voted in favour of the contribution limits in both the
Elections Act and the Accountability Act.
This approach could be supplemented by arguments that follow
Randall, specifically that contribution limits preclude political parties
from raising sufficient funds to carry on the level of public debate
required to engage the electorate. The argument, in other words, is that
a political party (or its candidates) has been denied the deliberative
equality the political finance regime is otherwise designed to promote.163
The contribution limits, it could be argued, impede the ability to raise
funds necessary to meaningfully participate in the electoral debate. This
reasoning is similar to the argument that prevailed in Libman, where
third party spending limits were constitutional in concept, but the actual
limits were too low to permit a meaningful campaign. 6" Strains of this
type of reasoning were heard during the recent Liberal leadership
campaign when the editors of the Globe and Mail, among others,
lamented the impact of contribution limits on the ability of candidates to
effectively participate in the leadership contest.6 This type of challenge
could draw upon process theory and would seek to import the rule in
Figueroa-that political finance laws not exacerbate pre-existing
economic disparities-from section 3 of the Charter to section 2(b) of
the Charter.166 The system of election expense reimbursement for
candidates and political parties, together with enhanced inter-election
public funding for political parties, detracts from the urgency of any
such claim by established political parties and candidates. For such a
claim to have maximum resonance it must be brought by an emerging
political party that has not yet qualified for public funding. 167
Even though the Liberals are the most adversely affected by the
reduction in the level of contribution limits, an emerging political party
6 On "deliberative equality," see Colin Feasby, "The Supreme Court of Canada's Political
Theory and the Constitutionality of the Political Finance Regime" in Ewing & Issacharoff, Party
Fundig, supra note 74, 243 at 248-53.
'6' Libman, supra note 7 at paras. 58-82. The concept of "meaningful participation" also figured
prominently in the context of s. 3 in Figueroa, supra note 95. See also Bowman v. United Kingdom, [ 1998]
E.C.H.R. 175, where the European Court of Human Rights struck down a £5 spending limit for third
parties on the grounds that it effectively precluded participation in the electoral debate.
""Those fundraising blues," supra note 86.
'
66 Figueroa, supra note 95 at para. 54.
167 This type of challenge was brought by the emerging Reform Party against the free
broadcasting regime in Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G.) (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4th) 366
(Alta. C.A.).
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could bring a broader challenge that invokes the partisan bias of the
Accountability Act in support of a larger argument against the
constitutionality of contribution limits. Such an argument would emphasize
that the introduction of contribution limits was a fundamental change
from the historical mode of political finance regulation in Canada and
would question whether there was any evidence that spending limits
failed to address Parliament's concerns. The broader argument against
contribution limits would also necessarily claim that in addition to
whatever partisan effects exist amongst the established political parties,
the contribution limits entrench the status quo and protect established
parties as a group from insurgent ones. Such a claim would require
empirical evidence that contribution limits create an entry barrier for new
political parties.168 In this regard, US studies, which demonstrate little
consensus on the effect of contribution limits on political competition, are
of little use because of the existence of spending limits in Canada.'69 The
Court would have to balance all of these arguments against the egalitarian,
democratizing, and anti-corruption benefits of contribution limits.
B. Is the Ban on Union and Corporate Contributions Unconstitutional?
1. The Union Prohibition
The 2003 Elections Act prohibited trade union and corporate
contributions to registered political parties but preserved the ability of
trade unions and corporations to make small contributions to candidates
and electoral district political party organizations. The Accountability
Actmade the ban on trade union and corporate contributions complete
by forbidding contributions to candidates and electoral district political
party organizations.
As discussed, political finance controls have traditionally been
questioned on the grounds that they may violate freedom of expression.
Indeed, the ban on union and corporate contributions raises such concerns.
'68 On the contrary, one might argue that an emphasis on lowering entry barriers only
assists small political parties that are well financed and question how this can be reconciled with an
egalitarian model of election regulation. At the same time, however, it could be asserted that the
renewal brought to the political system by new parties-well financed or otherwise-is worth paying
some measure of anti-egalitarian price.
'"I Richard L. Hasen, "The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and
Balancing in Campaign Finance Law after Randall v. Sorrell" (2007) 68 Ohio St. L.J. 849.
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Many of the concerns already discussed that attend contribution limits
generally also apply in the context of limits on corporations and unions.
However, there are certain additional issues raised by the outright ban
on political contributions by corporations and unions. These issues arise
under both the Charteis section 2(b) guarantee of freedom of expression
and the section 2(d) guarantee of freedom of association.
Section 2(d) protects the right of individuals to associate with
one another to pursue common objects. It does not confer constitutional
protection on group activities that are not constitutionally protected if
pursued by individuals. In Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.),7 ° the Supreme
Court explained that section 2(d) analysis comes down to a single
question: "[H]as the state precluded activity because of its associational
nature, thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals?"''
In Libman the Court held that spending limits in the Quebec
Referendum Act 72 on individuals and groups not affiliated with the
officially sanctioned "Yes" or "No" committees violated freedom of
expression. The limits were also found to be so low as not to be justifiable
under section 1 of the Charter. Libman is 'not often thought of as a
section 2(d) case; however, the case was brought by both Robert Libman
and the Equality Party and the issue of freedom of association was
argued. Indeed, the Court found that the spending limits contravened
freedom of association as well as freedom of expression.'73
Unions and, perhaps to a lesser extent, corporations are
associations of individuals. As such, corporations and unions stand in
relation to elections in the same position that the Equality Party in Libman
stood in relation to the Quebec referendum. The ban on corporate and
union contributions is an obvious breach of freedom of association when
it is considered that individual contributions are permitted subject to the
$1,000 limit in the Accountability Act. The long tradition of permitting
union and corporate political contributions, both before and during the
Charter era, further supports this conclusion by making clear that the
purpose of the ban is to discourage the collective pursuit of common goals.
The question, then, is whether or not the ban on corporate and union
contributions can be justified under section 1 of the Charter
170 [200113 S.C.R. 1016.
'z' Ibid. at para. 16.
'7 2 R.S.O. c. C-64.1.
1
73 Libman, supra note 7 at paras. 36-37.
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Reasons for limiting corporate and union contributions in both
the Elections Act and the Accountability Act are broadly reminiscent of
those considered in US cases. First, the prohibition on corporate and
union contributions addresses the perception that political parties are
unduly beholden to corporate and union donors. Second, limiting the
right to make political contributions to individuals reinforces the role of
the individual in the democratic process. As such, the prohibition of
political contributions by corporations and unions broadly aligns the
right to make contributions with democratic rights under the Charter.'
Third, the prohibition of political contributions by corporations and
unions removes the possibility of shareholder funds and union
membership dues being used for purposes that they do not approve of-
this is the "other people's money" problem described by Winkler.'75
While the first two rationales are consistent with the egalitarian model
of election regulation endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the
last rationale has little resonance in Canadian case law.
The issue of union contributions came before the Supreme
Court of Canada in a different context in Lavigne."6 The question in that
case was whether or not an individual's freedoms of association and
expression were violated by a union's use of mandatory dues collected
under state authority to support the union's political activities. The
political activities that the individual objected to were, generally speaking,
support of the NDP and left-leaning causes. The Supreme Court, though
divided, held that the use of union dues collected under -statutory
authority was subject to the Charter. The Court unanimously decided that
if the Charter applied, then any infringement of the rights to freedom of
association and freedom of expression was justified. Justice Wilson,
writing for herself and Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, cited US and Privy
Council authorities for theproposition that unions are inherently political
organizations and that their legitimate objectives extend beyond collective
bargaining.177 Justice Wilson went on to conclude that union political.
174 Minors and permanent residents who do not enjoy democratic rights under the Charter
are permitted to make political contributions. Accordingly, it is more accurate to say that the right
to make political contributions is limited to those who have democratic rights or are capable of
obtaining democratic rights by attaining voting age or through naturalization.
"7 5Winkler, "Other People's Money," supra note 146.
" 6 Lavigne, supra note 9.
'lnternational Associations of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) at 812;
Colleymore v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1207 (J.C.P.C.) at 1211.
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activity was connected to, and could not be separated from, the
achievement of other union objectives. Justice La Forest, writing for
himself and Justices Sopinka and Gonthier, also commented favourably
on the constructive role played by unions in the Canadian political
process and specifically noted traditional union support of the NDP.17 8
Plausible arguments can be made that the ban on contributions
by unions to political parties cannot be justified under section 1. First,
the prohibition on union contributions operates disproportionately to
the detriment of the NDP. This obvious partisan impact, together with
the Supreme Court's recognition of the positive aspects of union
involvement in the political process in Lavigne, provides a good basis for
arguing that the union contribution ban is not justified under section 1.
Several factors are balanced against the partisan effects of the ban
and the positive historic contribution of unions to the political process.
Unions would have -to show why they differ not only from regular
corporations but also from non-profit corporations and interest groups
that are captured by the contribution limits. There is also the reality that
the contribution ban was supported by Canada's largest unions and the
principal beneficiary of union political donations, the NDP. A court would
understandably have a difficult time taking seriously arguments about the
deleterious effects of the ban when such effects were understood and
anticipated at the time of the adoption of the ban and were widely
supported by those most affected by it.17 9 Furthermore, the continued
ability of motivated union members to volunteer in political campaigns
and contribute out of their own funds, and for unions to encourage their
members to do so, is a mitigating factor. Other factors, such as the third
party spending limits upheld in Harper that narrowed an alternative
outlet for union political money, could affect a court's analysis of the
constitutionality of the ban on union political contributions.
All of this discussion may be moot if the $1,000 individual
contribution limit in the AccountabilityAct is constitutional. The practical
reality is that for a major national union, a contribution limit of $1,000 is
so low as to effectively be a ban. As a result, any NDP or union strategy to
challenge the ban on union political contributions would have to be part
"8 Lavigne, supra note 9 at para. 270.
" Louis Massicotte, "Electoral Legislation Since 1997: Parliament Regains the Initiative"
in John H. Pammet & Christopher Dornan, eds., The Canadian Federal Election of2006(Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2006) 196 at 207.
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of a larger challenge of contribution limits. Such an argument would
inevitably emphasize the inappropriateness of applying a contribution
limit designed for individuals to a group of individuals. The positive
ideological disposition of the NDP and its union allies toward political
finance controls and the benefits that accrue to the NDP from the
prohibition on corporate contributions and individual contribution limits
make a constitutional challenge by the NDP or its union allies unlikely.
2. The Corporate Prohibition
Much of the discussion of the prohibition on union contributions
applies mutatis mutandis to corporations. Indeed, the applicable
constitutional framework is the same. The difference between the position
of corporations and unions is that unions comprise individuals of roughly
equal standing, each of whom are citizens or residents of Canada, whereas
corporations may have shareholders with widely varying ownership stakes
and who are neither residents nor citizens of Canada. 80 In this way, the
majoritarian and egalitarian underpinnings of the regulation of political
finance weigh heavily against the prospects of any challenge against the ban
on corporate contributions. The lack of any positive commentary on
corporate participation in the democratic process stands in contrast to the
favourable commentary about union political activities in Lavigne. The best
case scenario for opponents of the ban on corporate contributions is for
parallel treatment if the union contribution ban is struck down.
C. Are Political Party Spending Limits Now Unconstitutional?
One of the bedrock assumptions of Canadian political finance
law has been that spending limits on candidates and political parties are
constitutional. While these limits have never been tested by a court,
Harper upheld third party spending limits on the ground that they
buttressed the main pillars of the political finance regime, which are
spending limits on candidates and political parties. Harper mdikes it
clear that the objective of these pillars is to constrain the influence of
money on the political process.
1,o Arguments for identical treatment of corporations and unions would be less persuasive
-if rules were adopted to allow union members to opt out of support of union political activities with
which they disagree. Indeed, the existence of such a rule allowed the US Supreme Court to make a
distinction between corporations and unions in Austin, supra note 147 at 666.
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The interaction between contribution, limits and spending limits
has not been considered in Canada. That is why the US Supreme Court's
decisions in Buckley and Randall are of interest. Perhaps the most
important principle that may be drawn from those cases is that while
spending limits may theoretically be justifiable, they cannot be justified in
practice despite the pervasive influence of money in US politics. The
principal reason for this is the existence of contribution limits. Spending
limits are difficult to justify when contribution limits are already in place.
How do spending limits prevent the corruption of candidates when
contributors may only donate specific amounts? If anything, the lack of
spending limits creates an imperative to raise ever more funds that
inevitably dilutes the influence of individual contributors.'
Is the Canadian context so different that the principle drawn from
Buckley and Randall would not apply? The anti-corruption rationale
which is prevalent in the US jurisprudence is complemented and
overshadowed by the egalitarian justification in Canada. It is tempting to
assume that the egalitarianism in Canada's political finance law makes a
difference. Such an assumption, however, does not hold up under
scrutiny. Contribution limits are a far superior device for promoting the
egalitarian goals of the Canadian political finance regime than are
spending limits. Under the spending limit regime that prevailed from
1974 to 2003, it was theoretically possible for a candidate or political party
to obtain all necessary funds from a single contributor. While this extreme
scenario never happened, political parties did, to differing extents, depend
on large donations from wealthy individuals, unions, and corporations.
Under the new political finance regime, no individual is able to contribute
more than $1,000, which amounts to only a small fraction of the funds
necessary for the operation of a political party in a non-election period,
let alone during a campaign. As such, contribution limits are a far more
effective levelling device than spending limits.
The unintended consequence of Canada's new contribution
limits may be to render spending limits unconstitutional. As Harper
made clear, spending limits violate section 2(b) of the Charter but may
be justified under section 1 on egalitarian grounds. The Court declined
to second-guess Parliament in Harper as to whether its egalitarian
objective could have been accomplished by less intrusive means. Now
'i8 This is undoubtedly the reason that defenders of the Vermont spending limits in Randall
turned to the time preservation rationale. Today this rationale has little bearing on the Canadian context.
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Parliament has enacted what the US Supreme Court has found to be a
less intrusive means of accomplishing anti-corruption objectives-
contribution limits. There can be no real debate that contribution limits
are also a less intrusive means of accomplishing egalitarian objectives.
The presence of a less intrusive means substantially-perhaps
completely-undermines the justification for spending limits.
If spending limits are to survive, alternative justifications must
be made out. The first possible alternative justification is that spending
limits ensure that political parties have a measure of parity of resources.
In one respect this is an aesthetic argument-competition is more interesting
if the protagonists are evenly matched." 2 This argument is not unlike some
of the argumentg marshalled in favour of salary caps in professional sports.
Parity of resources may, however, be something more than just an
aesthetic objective. Measures that ensure some parity of resources might
be justifiable on the grounds that democratic debate is more robust
when opponents are evenly matched and, in turn, that the electorate
becomes more interested, informed, and engaged in the democratic
process. 83 The Supreme Court has, however, been reluctant to uphold
limits on expression that might promote a better quality of democratic
debate. 84 In addition, it is not clear whether there is any evidence that
supports this view or what kind of evidence the Court would require.
The second alternative justification has some foundation in
Canadian political finance and constitutional law. In Figueroa, the
Court held that election laws, and specifically political finance laws, may
not exacerbate pre-existing disparities in the resources of political
parties. While Figueroa does not mandate equality of resources, it does
preclude the exaggeration of unequal resources. The main concern in
Figueroa was for the fate of small or emerging political parties. In much
182 Another, less persuasive, aesthetic argument is that without spending limits, political
discourse may become dominated by large media, mass mailings, and other modern electioneering
techniques, to the exclusion of more voluntary grass-roots activities that bind citizens together.
However, it is not clear that more expensive campaigns would silence debate or stifle grass-roots
activities. Indeed, in one respect, more expensive elections combined with contribution limits
require more, not less, engagement with citizens in the form of fundraising activities.
I On deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy" in David Estlund, Democracy (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002) 87. In the context of
Canadian election law, deliberation-enhancing objectives are discussed in Colin Feasby, "Public
Opinion Poll Restrictions, Elections, and the Charter" (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 241.
1" See e.g. Thomson Newspapem supra note 108, where it was argued that limits on publication
of opinion polls for a short period before election day enhanced the quality of democratic debate.
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the same way, it is arguable that spending limits further the interests of
small political parties.'85 Essentially, spending limits ensure that elections
remain affordable and accessible for small or emerging political parties.
The affordability and accessibility of elections is necessary both for
citizens' exercise of the democratic right to run for public office,
protected under section 3 of the Charter, and for the renewal and health
of the democratic process as a whole. This argument, however, would
likely require some empirical evidence that small or emerging political
parties would be significantly discouraged from participating in the
democratic process or that their prospects of success would be
materially diminished by the removal of spending limits.186
A third alternative justification for spending limits might be the
promotion of access to the political process for women.187 The Lortie
Commission suggested that women face greater fundraising obstacles
than men, and recommended the introduction of contribution limits for
nomination contests to mitigate the problem.'88 There are several
problems with a gender access justification for spending limits. To begin
with, it would only apply to candidate spending limits and not to political
party spending limits. There is no reason to believe that party spending
limits would have any bearing on the women who do gain access to the
political process. Perhaps more importantly, a study of Canadian
provinces and territories found that women were marginally better
represented in jurisdictions without spending limits than those with
spending limits.'89 While this certainly does not prove that spending
limits are contrary to women's success in politics, it also does not
support the view that spending limits are necessary to assist women.
'0 Alternatively, it is arguable that spending limits hurt small parties that are well financed.
'S6 The question of the need for empirical evidence to justify limits of freedom of
expression in the electoral context was before the Supreme Court in Bryan, supra note 101, a case
concerning the publication of eastern election results prior to the close of polls in more westerly
time zones. For a critical view of the Supreme Court's lax approach to requiring evidence in
Harper, supra note 5 and other cases, see Jamie Cameron, "Governance and anarchy in the s. 2(b)
jurisprudence: A comment on Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canadd' (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 71.
18Similar fundraising impairments might be posited for minority candidates.
' "Lortie Commission," supra note 25 at 117.
'z' See Lisa Young, "Campaign Finance and Women's Representation in Canada and the
United States" in Steven Griner & Daniel Zovatto, eds., The Delicate Balance Between Political
Equality and Freedom of Expression: Political Pary and Campaign Financing in Canada and the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 2005) 47 at 57.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article has raised three questions about the constitutionality
of the new political finance regime. However, none of these questions will
be taken seriously unless the Court adopts a more critical approach to the
regulation of political process under section 1 of the Charter. The changes
to the political finance regime wrought by the Elections Act and
Accountability Act-particularly the individual contribution limits and
attendant changes to public funding and the prohibition of corporate and
union contributions-have an obvious partisan impact. If a constitutional
challenge to either contribution limits or the restrictions on unions and
corporations materializes and the Court fails to scrutinize Parliamentary
conflicts of interest, future governments will be free to manipulate the rules
of the democratic process for partisan advantage. Though such a challenge
might not necessarily succeed, at a minimum the Court must be alert to
the risk that self-serving legislation poses to the democratic process.
Perhaps the greatest risk to the integrity of the democratic process
is that the constitutional questions outlined in this article will never be
heard by a court. Unlike in the past with third party spending limits and
funding thresholds, there are no obvious protagonists to bring these
questions before a court for a resolution. Just as no major political party
challenged spending limits since the Chartefs adoption in 1982, there is
little reason to expect the major political parties to attack this legislation.
By the time any challenge materializes, it is likely that the immediate
partisan impacts of the reforms will have long since abated and the major
political parties will either have adapted to the new rules or ceased to
exist. At that time, the features of the legislation-individual contribution
limits, the prohibition on corporate and union contributions, and
spending limits-will be judged on their merits, divorced from the
partisan biases of the Elections Act and Accountability Act.
A constitutional challenge to contribution limits-the individual
limits or the corporate and union ban-would be more likely to succeed in
the short term, while the partisan effects are still discernible. However, if
contribution limits survive a challenge, or if the immediate partisan context
of the legislation passes without a challenge to contribution limits, the most
obvious and pressing constitutional question will be the validity of spending
limits. The question of whether contribution limits render spending limits
redundant is timeless in nature. Indeed, once the limits become entrenched
and accepted as part of the Canadian political finance regime, the
likelihood that a court will invalidate spending limits on the assumption of
the permanence and constitutionality of contribution limits rises.
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APPENDIX I
Top 10 Political Contributions 199990
[ Donor Type of Donor Political Party ] Amount
1. Estate of Robert Lauzi~re Individual BLOC 221,906
2. OFL Union NDP 127,120
3. Bank of Nova Scotia Corporate Liberal 119,619
4. CEP Union NDP 117,320
5. CUPE Union NDP 113,345
6. CanWest Global Communications Corporate Liberal 87,173
Corporation
7. UFCW Union NDP 83,430
8. USWA District 6 Union NDP 71,597
9. CAW Union NDP 69,043
10. Bombardier Inc. Corporate Liberal 63,481
Top 10 Political Contributions 2000
- Donor Type of Donor Political Party Amount
1. CLC Union NDP 683,947.12
2. CAW Union NDP 452,177.25
3. USWA National Union NDP 254,415.98
4. UFCW Union NDP 196,670.45
5. CUPE Union NDP 192,107.69
6. USWA District 6 Union NDP 178,945.42
7. Canadian Imperial Bank of Corporate Liberal 154,636.77
Commerce
8. CEP Union NDP 139,261.14
9. Bombardier Inc. Corporate Liberal 100,502.68
10. Canadian Machinists Political Union NDP 97,783.87
League I I
90 Excluding transfers from local and provincial party organizations.
[VOL. 45, NO. 3
2007] Canada's Political Finance Regime
Top 10 Political Contributions 2001
-[e of Donor Political Party Amount
I. Bracken House Trust Trust PC 4,243,584
2. USWA District 6 Union NDP 193,362.32
3. CUPE Union NDP 187,859.02
4. USWA National Union NDP 142,893.02
5. Bombardier Inc. Corporate Liberal 142,503.80
6. CLC Union NDP 122,803.75
7. CEP Union NDP 117,529.43
8. CAW Union NDP 87,076.95
9. UFCW Union NDP 85,123.65
10. Bank of Montreal Corporate Liberal 83,800.89
Top 10 Political Contributions 2002
[Donor Type of Donor Political Party Amount
1. OPSEU-SEFPO Union NDP 250,450.00
2. Bombardier Inc. Corporate Liberal 142,359.89
3. CEP Union NDP 123,281.36
4. USWA District 6 Union NDP 109,680.10
5. Robert Mallen Individual NDP 100,893.67
6. UFCW Union NDP 97,432.00
7. USWA National Union NDP 83,000.00
8. Bank of Montreal Corporate Liberal 76,184.30
9. Manalta Investments Inc. Corporate Liberal 75,000.00
10. Power Corporation of Canada I Corporate Liberal 70.000.00
Top 10 Political Contributions 2003
[Donor Type of Donor J Political Party [Amount
1. 55555 Inc. Corporate Liberal 2,974,341.20
2. CEP Union NDP 761,910.00
3. UFCW Union NDP 740,600.00
4. CAW Union NDP 736,733.20
5. Magna International Corporate Conservative 380,337.43
6. CUPE Union NDP 334,710.00
7. USWA National Union NDP 316,090.00
8. PM Capital Inc. Corporate Conservative 275,000.00
9. USWA District 6 Union NDP 259,823.20
10. OPSEU-SEFPO Union NDP 252,619.60
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APPENDIX II
Number of Contributions to Major Registered Political Parties, 1989-2005
1 BLOC Conservative liberal NDP Reform/ PC
I Alliance
1989 23,859 90,771 7,606 49,635
1990 42,035 118,339 71,722 34,887
1991 30,256 95,840 45,462 34,799
1992 •- 32,973 76,589 57,238 34,958
1993 - 48,686 66,680 50,927 53,626
1994 29,085 - 43,859 55,511 29,756 16,641
1995 25,848 - 46,681 57,065 33,907 18,101
1996 17,030 - 45,018 50,322 68,047 21,543
1997 18,886 - 42,043 51,965 77,014 26,590
1998 10,541 - 39,385 46,327 56,317 19,794
1999 13,104 - 38,230 43,000 54,518 18,262
2000 20,633 - 42,348 57,934 266,720 14,777
2001 5,980 - 6,536 28,221 49,354 13,392
2002 5,499 - 17,891 35,614 95,531 11,555
2003 5,277 - 21,830 33,265 82,316 17,941
2004 8,775 68,382 17,429 30,097 - -
2005 7,773 106,818 23,878 27,824 -
Value of Contributions to Major Registered Political Parties by Corporations, 1989-2003
BLOC ILiberal NDP Reform PC
1989 0 3,931,263 54,323 141,184 6,942,728
1990 0 4,567,820 141,509 138,039 6,349,996
1991 0 3,411,803 291,692 490,743 6,660,310
1992 0 3,501,792 129,818 613,102 6,793,081
1993 0 8,307,383 147,332 1,021,634 13,215,683
1994 0 5,980,286 127,920 569,907 2,060,476
1995 0 7,510,127 425,445 815,520 2,859,552
1996 0 7,814,722 188,344 907,769 3,106,031
1997 0 11,229,478 269,847 1,910,961 6,435,732
1998 0 7,734,420 244,919 1,291,094 2,905,154
1999 0 8,624,397 342,459 1,504,736 2,241,201
2000 360,153 11,862,693 198,757 6,753,356 2,777,286
2001 7,000 6,411,391 47,542 873,989 1,457,507
2002 88,350 5,144,528 95,269 1,121,519 1,038,908
2003 67,209 10,816,396 109,958 1,319,144 1,155,746
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Corporate Contributions as a Percentage of Total Contributions to Each Political Party, 1989-2003
BLOC iuberal NDP Reform PC
1989 0 62.2 0.8 10.5 50.3
1990 0 37.9 1.8 6.2 57.5
1991 0 50.3 3.3 9.4 55.3
1992 0 46.4 1.8 9.8 58.9
1993 0 56.4 1.6 14.4 59.3
1994 0 50.8 1.3 11.9 49.9
1995 0 56.8 3.4 18.8 51.3
1996 0 55.4 1.6 12.6 46.3
1997 0 64.2 1.9 21.7 58.6
1998 0 56.4 4.4 22.4 50.0
1999 0 60.0 5.3 23.9 43.6
2000 15.9 59.1 2.2 34.4 49.4
2001* 7.6 51.4 0.9 18.3 18.3
2002* 9.7 38.8 1.8 15.4 30.9
2003* 6.6 44.8 1.0 15.8 26.7
Value of Contributions to Major Registered Political Parties by Trade Unions, 1989-2003
IBLOC I.Aberal NDP Reform PC
1989 0 2,882 1,006,689 0 0
1990 0 3,443 1,170,766 0 0
1991 0 3,659 1,082,960 0 0
1992 0 3,639 1,189,755 0 0
1993 0 39,497 3,182,396 0 0
1994 0 10,731 808,594 0 0
1995 0 24,363 1,214,559 0 0
1996 0 10,658 1,250,079 0 0
1997 0 15,704 2,749,574 0 0
1998 0 19,068 1,021,428 0 0
1999 0 39,904 1,652,684 0 0
2000 36,008 77,331 3,022,480 0 0
2001 7,000 40,481 1,391,652 0 6,061
2002 17,100 51,214 1,021,481 0 0
2003 20,300 111,938 5,198,717 0 0
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Trade Union Contributions as a Percentage of Total Contributions to Each Political Party, 1989-2003
[BLOC Liberal NDP Reform PC
1989 0 14 0 0
1990 0 14.9 0 0
1991 0.1 12.3 0 0
1992 0 16.8 0 0
1993 0.3 34.8 0 0
1994 0 0.1 8.0 0 0
1995 0 0.1 9.8 0 0
1996 0 0.1 10.4 0 0
1997 0 0.1 19.6 0 0
1998 0 0.1 18.5 0 0
1999 0 0.2 25.7 0 0
2000 1.6 0.4 33.7 0 0
2001 7.1 0.3 27.6 0 0
2002 1.9 0.4 19.4 0 0
2003 2.0 0.5 51.5 0 0
